Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/exploit-reportingnpx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill exploit-reportinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/exploit-reporting)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/exploit-reporting"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/exploit-reporting.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00035 | $0.05762 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00017 | $0.02881 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.01152 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00576 |
Grade A, and why
exploit-reporting scanned grade A with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootlowPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
- Escalate privileges via local kernel or sudo misconfigurations Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s -I http://10.0.1.50:8080/struts2/ | grep -i server This is a copy
94% identical to exploit-reporting — 34 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 461 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Exploitation Reporting Knowledge Base
Exploitation findings are only operationally useful when documented with enough precision that anyone can reproduce the access, understand the impact, and trace the full attack path. This skill defines how to structure, score, and persist exploitation findings within the Atlas engagement directory.
1. Exploitation Finding Template
Every verified successful exploitation MUST produce a finding Markdown file in the active engagement workspace's findings/ directory named FIND-{NNN}.md. The file name and id field in YAML frontmatter (FIND-001, FIND-002, ...) are the canonical cross-reference — determine the next ID by counting existing files. Do not create placeholder finding files.
---
id: FIND-001
severity: CRITICAL
cvss_score: 9.3
cvss_vector: "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
cwe: CWE-78
mitre: T1190
affected_target: 10.0.1.50
affected_component: "Apache Struts 2.5.30 — /struts2/upload.action"
confidence: confirmed
objective_id: OBJ-EXP-001
phase: initial-access
agent: exploit
detected: false
remediation_priority: immediate
discovered_at: "2026-04-06T14:32:00Z"
---
# [CRITICAL] Remote Code Execution via Apache Struts CVE-2023-50164 on 10.0.1.50:8080 — Root Shell Achieved
## Description
Apache Struts 2.5.30 is vulnerable to CVE-2023-50164, a file upload path traversal flaw in the `FileUploadInterceptor`. An unauthenticated attacker can manipulate the `Upload-Dir` parameter during a multipart upload request to traverse outside the intended upload directory and write an arbitrary file — including a JSP webshell — to the web root. This achieves unauthenticated remote code execution as the Tomcat service account.
The vulnerability exists because `FileUploadInterceptor` does not canonicalize the destination path before writing, allowing `../` sequences to escape the configured upload directory.
## Steps to Reproduce
```bash
# 1. Confirm the target is running Struts (identified during recon)
curl -s -I http://10.0.1.50:8080/struts2/ | grep -i server
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 461 lines · 35 tokens per session scan A b565b6ad7508
exploit-reporting is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 35 tokens to every session and 5,762 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 2 findings (asks for root, makes network calls). It is 94% identical to exploit-reporting, differing in 34 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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