Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill graphqlgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/graphql)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/graphql"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/graphql/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/graphql"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/graphql.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00024 | $0.01515 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00758 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00303 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00152 |
Grade A, and why
graphql scanned grade A with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLlowData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "http://<TARGET>$path" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"query":"{ __typename }"}') Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "http://<TARGET>$path" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"query":"{ __typename }"}') This is a copy
100% identical to graphql — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 112 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
GraphQL Exploitation
Exploits GraphQL APIs for data exfiltration, SQL injection through resolvers, authentication/authorization bypass, and batch query abuse.
Discovery
# Common GraphQL endpoints
for path in /graphql /graphiql /v1/graphql /v2/graphql /api/graphql /query /gql /graphql/console; do
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "http://<TARGET>$path" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"query":"{ __typename }"}')
[ "$code" != "404" ] && [ "$code" != "000" ] && echo "$path -> HTTP $code"
done
# Check for GraphiQL IDE (browser-based)
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/graphiql' | grep -i 'graphiql\|graphql'
Introspection — Schema Dump
# Quick schema overview — list all types and their fields
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/graphql' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"query":"{ __schema { types { name kind fields { name type { name kind ofType { name } } } } } }"}' | python3 -m json.tool
# List all query types (entry points)
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/graphql' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"query":"{ __schema { queryType { fields { name args { name type { name } } type { name kind ofType { name } } } } } }"}' | python3 -m json.tool
# List all mutations
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/graphql' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"query":"{ __schema { mutationType { fields { name args { name type { name } } } } } }"}' | python3 -m json.tool
# Full introspection query (complete schema)
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/graphql' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"query":"query IntrospectionQuery { __schema { queryType { name } mutationType { name } subscriptionType { name } types { ...FullType } } } fragment FullType on __Type { kind name fields(includeDeprecated: true) { name args { name type { ...TypeRef } } type { ...TypeRef } } inputFields { name type { ...TypeRef } } enumValues(includeDeprecated: true) { name } } fragment TypeRef on __Type { kind name ofType { kind name ofType { kind name ofType { kind name } } } }"}' | python3 -m json.tool
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 112 lines · 24 tokens per session scan A c2110b4011eb
graphql is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 24 tokens to every session and 1,515 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 2 findings (sends data to an external url, makes network calls). It is 100% identical to graphql, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
Other skills, from other repositories
web-app-pentest
../../../pentest/web-app-pentest/SKILL.md.
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