Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill smugglinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/smuggling)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/smuggling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/smuggling/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/smuggling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/smuggling.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00097 | $0.09617 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00048 | $0.04809 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00019 | $0.01923 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00962 |
Grade B, and why
smuggling scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLmediumData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
curl -s -i -c cookies.txt -d "username=$LOW_USER&password=$LOW_PASS" "$TARGET/<login_path>" | tee login.txt Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
| 1 | `curl -sv <TARGET>/` 2>&1 \| grep -iE '^(server\|via\|x-)' | First-line tier (front-most CDN/WAF/MITM banner) | This is a copy
95% identical to smuggling — 3 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 656 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
HTTP Request Smuggling (Desync)
Exploits parser disagreement between two HTTP intermediaries on the same connection (front-end CDN/proxy ↔ back-end origin). When one side ends a request at byte X and the other at byte Y, the bytes between X and Y are the "smuggled" prefix of the next victim request — letting the attacker rewrite the next user's request, steal cookies/headers, or hit auth-bypassed routes.
When This Skill Is Primary
HRS bypasses authentication and authorization at the front-end/back-end boundary — it does NOT need correct credentials. When smuggling_desync (or request_smuggling / hrs / desync) co-occurs with credential-related tags (default_credentials, jwt, weak_password), smuggling IS the primary attack vector. Credential brute-force is a fallback only after the confirm-desync gate (below) fires NEGATIVE.
Reasoning: a CTF that ships both tags is signaling "you have a low-priv account (test:test, etc.) — use it as your session anchor and bypass the role check via parser disagreement." Burning the time budget on admin:* brute-force misses the design entirely. Use the low-priv credentials as the OUTER request session; smuggle the privileged INNER request.
The same logic applies when smuggling_desync co-occurs with cve (the CVE is likely the desync primitive; e.g., CVE-2022-24766 is mitmproxy h1 smuggling — see Variant Catalog → CL.0 / pause-based desync below).
Recognition Signals
Trigger this skill when ANY of the following are present:
- Multi-proxy stack visible: two
Server:strings across responses (e.g.cloudflarethengunicorn);Via:header present; CDN/edge fingerprint (Cloudflare CF-RAY, AWS CloudFront, Akamai, Fastly). - Differential 400/501 when sending duplicate/obfuscated
Transfer-EncodingorContent-Lengthheaders (one path 200, another 400/501). - HTTP/2 frontend with HTTP/1.1 backend (
alt-svc: h2,:statuspseudo-header,HTTP/2ALPN). Downgrades are the modern smuggling surface. - Pipelining differences: connection reused across requests with inconsistent framing.
- Challenge tag includes
smuggling_desync,request_smuggling,hrs,desync, or recon's "Frontend behavior" line says "frontend forwards malformed framing". - Recon handoff notes that the same payload yields different status codes when sent to different proxy hops or with different framing.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 656 lines · 97 tokens per session scan B 6c44ac381f5c
smuggling is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 97 tokens to every session and 9,617 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (sends data to an external url, makes network calls). It is 95% identical to smuggling, differing in 3 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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