Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill threat-profilegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/threat-profile)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/threat-profile"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/threat-profile/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/threat-profile"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/threat-profile.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00036 | $0.01022 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00018 | $0.00511 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00204 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00102 |
Grade A, and why
threat-profile scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 84 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Threat Profile Builder
Threat profiling defines who the red team is emulating. Without a clear profile, the engagement devolves into arbitrary tool usage instead of realistic adversary simulation.
When to Use
- During CONOPS creation when selecting a threat actor
- User asks about threat actors, APT groups, or adversary emulation
- Need to map engagement scope to realistic attacker behaviors
Workflow
Step 1: Determine Tier
Ask the user which tier fits. If they're unsure, recommend based on engagement type:
| Tier | Actor Type | Sophistication | Best For |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Opportunistic attacker | Low | Vulnerability assessment, external scan |
| 2 | Targeted cybercriminal | Medium | Penetration test, focused engagement |
| 3 | APT / nation-state | High | Full red team, advanced simulation |
| 4 | Insider threat | Varies | Internal assessment, assumed breach |
Step 2: Build the Profile
Gather or derive these fields — see references/adversary-archetypes.md for pre-built profiles and references/apt-groups.md for known APT group details:
- Name/Alias — Known group or custom archetype
- Sophistication — low / medium / high / nation-state
- Motivation — financial, espionage, disruption, hacktivism
- Initial Access — MITRE technique IDs for how they get in
- Key TTPs — Top 5-10 MITRE ATT&CK techniques
- Tools & Infrastructure — Realistic toolset for this actor
Step 3: Validate Against RoE
The profile must be consistent with what the RoE allows. There's no point emulating spearphishing if social engineering isn't authorized.
| RoE Constraint | Profile Implication |
|---|---|
| External only, no social engineering | Focus on T1190, T1595, T1133 |
| Phishing authorized | Include T1566, T1598 |
| Internal assumed breach | Start from T1078 (Valid Accounts) |
| Full red team | Full kill chain TTPs |
Step 4: Output
Generate two payloads:
(a) Standalone plan/threat-profile.json — full ThreatProfile schema:
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 84 lines · 36 tokens per session scan A aac65f05a5b8
threat-profile is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 36 tokens to every session and 1,022 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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