known-advisory-backport-check

known-advisory-backport-check is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from mtarcure/claude-vibe-squad. It costs 70 tokens per session (742 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A dependency-vulnerability check for projects that pin, fork, or include copies of other software libraries. It compares the actual resolved versions with security fixes published by the original project.

In plain words
What is it for?
It helps inspect dependency files, compare versions with advisories, and confirm whether a known vulnerable component is enabled and reachable.
Why use it?
Forks and old pinned versions can miss later fixes, even when the vulnerable code is still active in the target project.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one. Also seen: installed under .agents/ (shared by several agents).

Good fit It helps inspect dependency files, compare versions with advisories, and confirm whether a known vulnerable component is enabled and reachable.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/mtarcure/claude-vibe-squad/known-advisory-backport-check
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add mtarcure/claude-vibe-squad --skill known-advisory-backport-check
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mtarcure/claude-vibe-squad

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for known-advisory-backport-check

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mtarcure/claude-vibe-squad/known-advisory-backport-check/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mtarcure/claude-vibe-squad/known-advisory-backport-check)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mtarcure/claude-vibe-squad/known-advisory-backport-check"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mtarcure/claude-vibe-squad/known-advisory-backport-check/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for known-advisory-backport-check

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mtarcure/claude-vibe-squad/known-advisory-backport-check"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mtarcure/claude-vibe-squad/known-advisory-backport-check.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 70 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 742 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00070 $0.00742
Opus 5.5 $0.00028 $0.00297
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00014 $0.00148
Haiku 4.5 $0.00007 $0.00074

Measured 1mo ago against content hash cc94ae60b7a1, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

known-advisory-backport-check scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.agents/skills/known-advisory-backport-check/SKILL.md · 22 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 22 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

known-advisory-backport-check

For any target that forks or pins a dependency (a forked cosmos/evm, an old cosmos-sdk/cometbft, a vendored library): known upstream vulnerabilities the target failed to patch are reachable, low-effort findings. Run this early — it's the cheapest high-value pass and it's what the 52-competitor crowd's osv-scan finds first.

Steps

  1. Enumerate pinned versions. Read go.mod/Cargo.toml/package.json including replace/=> directives (the replace wins — audit the ACTUAL resolved version, e.g. cosmos/evm => a bridge target/evm v1.0.0-rc2...).
  2. Pull the advisory set. osv-scanner --lockfile <lock> for the dep graph; gh api repos/<upstream>/security-advisories for published GHSAs; the upstream SECURITY.md / release notes / advisory index (Hacken, Cosmos ASA, etc.).
  3. For each Critical/High advisory: get affected + first_patched_version (gh api /advisories/<GHSA>), compare to the pinned version. Behind the fix = candidate.
  4. Reachability + config. Is the vulnerable module/function actually WIRED and reachable at no privilege in THIS target's config? (e.g. is x/group registered + in EndBlock? is the ICS20 precompile activated? is the affected code path called?) A vuln in an unused code path doesn't pay.
  5. Fork-diff for missing backports. If it's a fork of a release-candidate (-rcN) or a frozen branch, the upstream may have shipped a security fix AFTER the fork point. Diff the fork vs upstream for the fix's presence — a code-pattern fix (e.g. a snapshot/journal wrap, a signer check) can be silently dropped in a merge even when the version looks recent. Confirm the guard is present at the pinned commit.

The scope/dedup reality (be honest — protect the rep)

  • Known public CVEs are usually dedup-dead and often ruled "known / out-of-scope / third-party" — osv-scan is the crowd's first move. Do NOT submit a stock reachable-CVE as-is expecting payment; it's a near-certain rejection + rep penalty.
  • What DOES convert: (a) a fix that is genuinely MISSING/INCOMPLETE in the fork at the pinned commit (novel to this deployment), or (b) a Push-/target-SPECIFIC elevation where custom code makes the generic bug reachable/impactful in a way the advisory didn't cover. Novelty + a runnable PoC is the bar.
  • Either way: report the reachable-known ones to the project as free remediation (goodwill), and only SUBMIT the novel/incomplete-fix ones. Feed the decision to impact-validator (G3 dedup, G4 scope). Related: [[chain-construct]].

Read the full file on GitHub · 22 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 1mo ago First seen · 22 lines · 70 tokens per session scan A cc94ae60b7a1

Subscribe to this mod's changes

known-advisory-backport-check is a skill published in the GitHub repository mtarcure/claude-vibe-squad (165 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 70 tokens to every session and 742 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-19.