signature-validation-audit

signature-validation-audit is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from mtarcure/claude-vibe-squad. It costs 93 tokens per session (743 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A security-audit method for checking how EVM applications verify signed messages. EVM is the execution environment used by Ethereum and compatible blockchains.

In plain words
What is it for?
It is for auditing signature entry points such as permits, relayers, user-operation validation, and order settlement in smart contracts. It focuses on ECDSA recovery, ERC-1271 contract signatures, and precompile address handling.
Why use it?
Incorrect handling of failed signatures or special blockchain addresses can make an invalid signer appear valid. This method checks those cases with boundary tests and negative controls.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one. Also seen: installed under .agents/ (shared by several agents).

Good fit It is for auditing signature entry points such as permits, relayers, user-operation validation, and order settlement in smart contracts. It focuses on ECDSA recovery, ERC-1271 contract signatures, and precompile address handling.

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Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/mtarcure/claude-vibe-squad/signature-validation-audit
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add mtarcure/claude-vibe-squad --skill signature-validation-audit
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mtarcure/claude-vibe-squad

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

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README.md
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Per session 93 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 743 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00093 $0.00743
Opus 5.5 $0.00037 $0.00297
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00019 $0.00149
Haiku 4.5 $0.00009 $0.00074

Measured 1mo ago against content hash deebaa375342, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

signature-validation-audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.agents/skills/signature-validation-audit/SKILL.md · 44 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 44 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Signature-Validation Audit (ECDSA fallback · precompile shadowing)

Audit signature-verification code for two 2025-26 auth-bypass classes that let an attacker forge a "valid" signer: (a) ECDSA-fallback impersonation — a failed ecrecover/tryRecover (zero address) silently falls back to an ERC-1271 contract check whose signer address is attacker-influenced; and (b) precompile shadowing — using code.length == 0 as sole proof of an EOA, so the 0x1–0x9 precompiles (zero code length, non-reverting) are treated as EOAs and shadow the verification.

Source: corpus A §I.4 (Verichains / Sodium, July 2026, ~$270k — ECDSA fallback) and §I.5 (Verichains / Odos, Jan 2025, ~$50k — precompile shadowing). Impact class: funds theft / auth bypass (intrinsic). Governing method: Phase-3a hypothesis lane of systematic-attacking; emits leads only, held to the identical verification spine.

Method

  1. Enumerate every signature entrypoint (validateUserOp, permit paths, meta-tx relays, order settlement) with slither + a custom semgrep rule; map each to its recovery primitive.
  2. ECDSA fallback: flag any path where ecrecover/ECDSA.tryRecover returning address(0) (or a malformed-sig branch) does NOT hard-revert but instead routes to an ERC-1271 check. Verify the ERC-1271 signer is bound to an immutable, preconfigured owner, never a user-supplied payload field.
  3. Precompile shadowing: flag any EOA/contract discrimination that relies on extcodesize/ code.length. Build a forge boundary test that supplies precompile addresses 0x01–0x09 as the signer and asserts they are rejected.
  4. PoC on anvil --fork: supply an attacker contract (fallback case) or a precompile (shadowing case) as signer and drive an unauthorized approval/withdrawal; link-level negative control = a correctly-bound verifier rejects it.
  5. Add echidna/medusa properties: "zero-address recovery never authorizes" and "signer code length is never the sole EOA proof."

Read the full file on GitHub · 44 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 1mo ago First seen · 44 lines · 93 tokens per session scan A deebaa375342

Subscribe to this mod's changes

signature-validation-audit is a skill published in the GitHub repository mtarcure/claude-vibe-squad (165 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 93 tokens to every session and 743 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-19.