Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to mtnyilmaz/agents. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mtnyilmaz/agents/main/.agents/skills/sast-fileupload/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mtnyilmaz/agentsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mtnyilmaz/agents/sast-fileupload)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mtnyilmaz/agents/sast-fileupload"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mtnyilmaz/agents/sast-fileupload.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00088 | $0.06292 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00044 | $0.03146 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00018 | $0.01258 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00629 |
Grade A, and why
sast-fileupload scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
# VULNERABLE: content-type only check (trivially bypassed with curl -H) How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 558 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Insecure File Upload Detection
You are performing a focused security assessment to find insecure file upload vulnerabilities in a codebase. This skill uses a two-phase approach with subagents: discovery (find all places where uploaded files are received and stored) then bypass (determine whether an attacker can upload a malicious file by manipulating its extension or bypassing validation logic).
Prerequisites: sast/architecture.md must exist. Run the analysis skill first if it doesn't.
What is an Insecure File Upload
Insecure file upload occurs when an application accepts files from users without properly validating or restricting what can be uploaded, allowing an attacker to upload executable or malicious files. The most critical outcome is Remote Code Execution (RCE): an attacker uploads a web shell (e.g., a .php file) and the server executes it when accessed via a direct URL.
The core pattern: a user-supplied file reaches a storage location without adequate extension validation, and the stored file is accessible or executable.
What Insecure File Upload IS
- Accepting any file type with no extension or content check:
file.save(upload_path)with no validation - Content-Type-only validation: checking
Content-Type: image/pngwithout verifying the actual extension or file content — trivially bypassed by setting the header manually - Extension blocklist with gaps:
.phpis blocked but.php3,.php4,.php5,.phtml,.phar,.shtmlare not - Case-insensitive bypass: blocking
.phpbut allowing.PHP,.Php,.pHp - Double extension bypass:
shell.php.jpg— code extracts the last.jpgand considers it safe, but the server (Apache) serves it as PHP - Path traversal in filenames:
../../webroot/shell.phpstored via an unsanitized filename - Incomplete filename sanitization: only stripping
../but not encoded variants%2e%2e%2f - Serving uploaded files from a web-executable directory without disabling execution
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 558 lines · 88 tokens per session scan A 52106776384b
sast-fileupload is a skill published in the GitHub repository mtnyilmaz/agents (6 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 88 tokens to every session and 6,292 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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