ad-attacks

ad-attacks is a skill for Claude Code from mukul975/Threatswarm. It costs 39 tokens per session (4,283 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A reference for attacking Active Directory, Microsoft's system for managing users, computers, and permissions in a Windows network.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it with BloodHound, a tool that maps relationships in Active Directory, to investigate attack paths, Kerberos attacks, permission abuse, and AD CS weaknesses.
Why use it?
It gathers queries, attack paths, and misconfiguration checks in one place instead of requiring separate research during an assessment.

Skill for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: allowed-tools in frontmatter. Also seen: positional $N argument.

Good fit Use it with BloodHound, a tool that maps relationships in Active Directory, to investigate attack paths, Kerberos attacks, permission abuse, and AD CS weaknesses.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/mukul975/threatswarm/ad-attacks
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add mukul975/Threatswarm --skill ad-attacks
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/Threatswarm

Made for: Claude Code.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for ad-attacks

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mukul975/threatswarm/ad-attacks.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mukul975/threatswarm/ad-attacks)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mukul975/threatswarm/ad-attacks"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mukul975/threatswarm/ad-attacks.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>
Per session 39 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 4,283 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00039 $0.04283
Opus 5 $0.00019 $0.02142
Sonnet 5 $0.00008 $0.00857
Haiku 4.5 $0.00004 $0.00428

Measured 8d ago against content hash 386df7fab07a, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

ad-attacks scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.claude/skills/ad-attacks/SKILL.md · 394 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 394 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

BloodHound Cypher Queries (Neo4j / BloodHound CE)

Shortest Attack Paths

-- Shortest path from any owned computer to Domain Admin
MATCH p=shortestPath((c:Computer {owned:true})-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN [email protected]"}))
RETURN p

-- Shortest path from any owned user to Domain Admin
MATCH p=shortestPath((u:User {owned:true})-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN [email protected]"}))
RETURN p

-- All paths from owned nodes to Domain Admin (expand search)
MATCH p=allShortestPaths((n {owned:true})-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN [email protected]"}))
WHERE NOT n=g
RETURN p

-- Shortest path from any node to DA (non-DA owned)
MATCH (n), (g:Group {name:"DOMAIN [email protected]"})
WHERE n.owned = true AND NOT n IN nodes(shortestPath((n)-[*1..]->(g)))
MATCH p=shortestPath((n)-[*1..]->(g))
RETURN p LIMIT 10

High-Value Target Discovery

-- All Domain Admin users (including nested group membership)
MATCH (u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN [email protected]"})
RETURN u.name ORDER BY u.name

-- All Domain Controllers
MATCH (c:Computer)-[:MemberOf]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN [email protected]"})
RETURN c.name, c.operatingsystem

-- Find all computers where DA users are logged on
MATCH (u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN [email protected]"})
MATCH (u)-[:HasSession]->(c:Computer)
RETURN u.name, c.name, c.operatingsystem

-- Users with path to Domain Admin count (ranked)
MATCH (u:User), (g:Group {name:"DOMAIN [email protected]"})
WHERE EXISTS(shortestPath((u)-[*1..]->(g)))
RETURN u.name, u.enabled
ORDER BY u.name

Kerberoastable Accounts

-- All Kerberoastable users with path to DA
MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})
WHERE u.enabled = true
OPTIONAL MATCH p=shortestPath((u)-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN [email protected]"}))
RETURN u.name, u.serviceprincipalnames, p IS NOT NULL AS has_da_path
ORDER BY has_da_path DESC

-- Kerberoastable users not requiring password change
MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true, enabled:true, pwdneverexpires:true})
RETURN u.name, u.serviceprincipalnames, u.description

Read the full file on GitHub · 394 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 8d ago First seen · 394 lines · 39 tokens per session scan A 386df7fab07a

Subscribe to this mod's changes

ad-attacks is a skill published in the GitHub repository mukul975/Threatswarm (78 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 39 tokens to every session and 4,283 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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