Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add mukul975/Threatswarm --skill ad-attacksgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/ThreatswarmWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mukul975/threatswarm/ad-attacks)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mukul975/threatswarm/ad-attacks"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mukul975/threatswarm/ad-attacks.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00039 | $0.04283 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00019 | $0.02142 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00857 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00428 |
Grade A, and why
ad-attacks scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 394 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
BloodHound Cypher Queries (Neo4j / BloodHound CE)
Shortest Attack Paths
-- Shortest path from any owned computer to Domain Admin
MATCH p=shortestPath((c:Computer {owned:true})-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN [email protected]"}))
RETURN p
-- Shortest path from any owned user to Domain Admin
MATCH p=shortestPath((u:User {owned:true})-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN [email protected]"}))
RETURN p
-- All paths from owned nodes to Domain Admin (expand search)
MATCH p=allShortestPaths((n {owned:true})-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN [email protected]"}))
WHERE NOT n=g
RETURN p
-- Shortest path from any node to DA (non-DA owned)
MATCH (n), (g:Group {name:"DOMAIN [email protected]"})
WHERE n.owned = true AND NOT n IN nodes(shortestPath((n)-[*1..]->(g)))
MATCH p=shortestPath((n)-[*1..]->(g))
RETURN p LIMIT 10
High-Value Target Discovery
-- All Domain Admin users (including nested group membership)
MATCH (u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN [email protected]"})
RETURN u.name ORDER BY u.name
-- All Domain Controllers
MATCH (c:Computer)-[:MemberOf]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN [email protected]"})
RETURN c.name, c.operatingsystem
-- Find all computers where DA users are logged on
MATCH (u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN [email protected]"})
MATCH (u)-[:HasSession]->(c:Computer)
RETURN u.name, c.name, c.operatingsystem
-- Users with path to Domain Admin count (ranked)
MATCH (u:User), (g:Group {name:"DOMAIN [email protected]"})
WHERE EXISTS(shortestPath((u)-[*1..]->(g)))
RETURN u.name, u.enabled
ORDER BY u.name
Kerberoastable Accounts
-- All Kerberoastable users with path to DA
MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})
WHERE u.enabled = true
OPTIONAL MATCH p=shortestPath((u)-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:"DOMAIN [email protected]"}))
RETURN u.name, u.serviceprincipalnames, p IS NOT NULL AS has_da_path
ORDER BY has_da_path DESC
-- Kerberoastable users not requiring password change
MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true, enabled:true, pwdneverexpires:true})
RETURN u.name, u.serviceprincipalnames, u.description
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 394 lines · 39 tokens per session scan A 386df7fab07a
ad-attacks is a skill published in the GitHub repository mukul975/Threatswarm (78 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 39 tokens to every session and 4,283 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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