Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/mukul975/threatswarm/mitre-attacknpx skills add mukul975/Threatswarm --skill mitre-attackgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/ThreatswarmWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mukul975/threatswarm/mitre-attack)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mukul975/threatswarm/mitre-attack"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mukul975/threatswarm/mitre-attack.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00031 | $0.01519 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00759 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00304 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00152 |
Grade A, and why
mitre-attack scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 114 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Tactics (TA)
| Tactic ID | Tactic Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| TA0001 | Initial Access | Entry point into target environment |
| TA0002 | Execution | Running malicious code |
| TA0003 | Persistence | Maintaining foothold across reboots |
| TA0004 | Privilege Escalation | Gaining higher-level permissions |
| TA0005 | Defense Evasion | Avoiding detection |
| TA0006 | Credential Access | Stealing credentials |
| TA0007 | Discovery | Learning about the environment |
| TA0008 | Lateral Movement | Moving through the network |
| TA0009 | Collection | Gathering data of interest |
| TA0010 | Exfiltration | Stealing data |
| TA0011 | Command and Control | Communicating with compromised systems |
| TA0040 | Impact | Disrupting availability or integrity |
Top 50 ATT&CK Techniques
| TTP ID | Name | Tactic |
|---|---|---|
| T1595 | Active Scanning | Reconnaissance |
| T1592 | Gather Victim Host Information | Reconnaissance |
| T1593 | Search Open Websites/Domains | Reconnaissance |
| T1566 | Phishing | Initial Access |
| T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Initial Access |
| T1133 | External Remote Services | Initial Access |
| T1078 | Valid Accounts | Initial Access/Persistence/Defense Evasion |
| T1059.001 | PowerShell | Execution |
| T1059.003 | Windows Command Shell | Execution |
| T1059.004 | Unix Shell | Execution |
| T1053.005 | Scheduled Task | Execution/Persistence |
| T1204 | User Execution | Execution |
| T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys | Persistence |
| T1547.006 | Kernel Modules and Extensions | Persistence |
| T1543.003 | Windows Service | Persistence |
| T1548.002 | Bypass UAC | Privilege Escalation/Defense Evasion |
| T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Privilege Escalation |
| T1055 | Process Injection | Defense Evasion/Privilege Escalation |
| T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | Defense Evasion |
| T1562.001 | Disable or Modify Tools | Defense Evasion |
| T1070.001 | Clear Windows Event Logs | Defense Evasion |
| T1003.001 | LSASS Memory | Credential Access |
| T1003.003 | NTDS | Credential Access |
| T1110.001 | Password Guessing | Credential Access |
| T1110.003 | Password Spraying | Credential Access |
| T1558.003 | Kerberoasting | Credential Access |
| T1558.004 | AS-REP Roasting | Credential Access |
| T1040 | Network Sniffing | Credential Access/Discovery |
| T1087 | Account Discovery | Discovery |
| T1082 | System Information Discovery | Discovery |
| T1018 | Remote System Discovery | Discovery |
| T1046 | Network Service Discovery | Discovery |
| T1069 | Permission Groups Discovery | Discovery |
| T1021.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol | Lateral Movement |
| T1021.002 | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | Lateral Movement |
| T1021.006 | Windows Remote Management | Lateral Movement |
| T1550.002 | Pass the Hash | Lateral Movement |
| T1550.003 | Pass the Ticket | Lateral Movement |
| T1074 | Data Staged | Collection |
| T1056 | Input Capture | Collection/Credential Access |
| T1071.001 | Web Protocols (HTTP/S) | C2 |
| T1071.004 | DNS | C2 |
| T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol | C2 |
| T1572 | Protocol Tunneling | C2 |
| T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Exfiltration |
| T1048 | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | Exfiltration |
| T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | Impact |
| T1490 | Inhibit System Recovery | Impact |
| T1489 | Service Stop | Impact |
| T1562 | Impair Defenses | Defense Evasion |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 114 lines · 31 tokens per session scan A 290e791dccd3
mitre-attack is a skill published in the GitHub repository mukul975/Threatswarm (77 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 31 tokens to every session and 1,519 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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