Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add mukul975/Threatswarm --skill report-templatesgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/ThreatswarmWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mukul975/threatswarm/report-templates)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mukul975/threatswarm/report-templates"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mukul975/threatswarm/report-templates/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mukul975/threatswarm/report-templates"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mukul975/threatswarm/report-templates.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00030 | $0.04401 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00015 | $0.02201 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00880 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00440 |
Grade B, and why
report-templates scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
> cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254). Use a dedicated network egress proxy and Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 358 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
CVSS 3.1 Vector Reference
Format
CVSS:3.1/AV:[N|A|L|P]/AC:[L|H]/PR:[N|L|H]/UI:[N|R]/S:[U|C]/C:[N|L|H]/I:[N|L|H]/A:[N|L|H]
Score by Severity Tier
| Severity | Score Range | Typical Vector Example | Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | 9.0–10.0 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
9.8 |
| CRITICAL | 9.0–10.0 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H |
10.0 |
| HIGH | 7.0–8.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
8.8 |
| HIGH | 7.0–8.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N |
7.5 |
| HIGH | 7.0–8.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
7.8 |
| MEDIUM | 4.0–6.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N |
6.5 |
| MEDIUM | 4.0–6.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N |
5.4 |
| MEDIUM | 4.0–6.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N |
5.9 |
| LOW | 0.1–3.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N |
4.3 |
| LOW | 0.1–3.9 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N |
2.5 |
| INFO | 0.0 | N/A — informational only | 0.0 |
Pre-built Vectors by Vulnerability Type
Pre-auth RCE (internet-facing): AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.8
Post-auth RCE (authenticated): AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 8.8
SQLi (data exfil possible): AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N = 8.1
SQLi (read-only): AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N = 6.5
Stored XSS (unauthenticated): AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N = 6.1
Stored XSS (post-auth): AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N = 5.4
Reflected XSS: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N = 6.1
SSRF (internal access): AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N = 7.2
SSRF (cloud metadata): AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N = 9.6
Path traversal (file read): AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N = 7.5
LPE (local exploit): AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 7.8
Insecure deserialization: AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 8.1
IDOR (sensitive data): AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N = 6.5
IDOR (data modification): AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N = 8.1
Auth bypass (admin access): AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N = 9.1
Weak JWT (crackable secret): AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N = 7.4
Hardcoded credentials: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N = 9.1
Open redirect: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N = 6.1
Directory listing: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N = 5.3
Information disclosure: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N = 5.3
Missing HTTPS: AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N = 4.8
CSRF (state-changing): AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N = 6.5
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 358 lines · 30 tokens per session scan B 904773eda050
report-templates is a skill published in the GitHub repository mukul975/Threatswarm (78 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 30 tokens to every session and 4,401 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (cloud metadata endpoint). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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