Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/Threatswarmnpx agentmods add skills/mukul975/threatswarm/wordlistsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mukul975/threatswarm/wordlists)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mukul975/threatswarm/wordlists"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mukul975/threatswarm/wordlists/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mukul975/threatswarm/wordlists"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mukul975/threatswarm/wordlists.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00025 | $0.03079 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00013 | $0.01540 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00616 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00308 |
Grade A, and why
wordlists scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 326 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
SecLists Path Map
Base path: /usr/share/seclists/
Subdomain / DNS Enumeration
Discovery/DNS/bitquark-subdomains-top100000.txt # Top 100k subdomains
Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-110000.txt # 1M subdomains
Discovery/DNS/shubs-subdomains.txt # Alternative quality list
Discovery/DNS/dns-Jhaddix.txt # Comprehensive subdomain list
Discovery/DNS/namelist.txt # Short, fast list
Discovery/DNS/fierce-hostlist.txt # Fierce default list
Discovery/DNS/combined_subdomains.txt # Combined mega list
Web Directory / Content Enumeration
Discovery/Web-Content/raft-medium-words.txt # Balanced: 63k entries (RECOMMENDED)
Discovery/Web-Content/raft-large-words.txt # Large: 119k entries
Discovery/Web-Content/raft-small-words.txt # Fast: 43k entries
Discovery/Web-Content/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt # Dirb classic medium
Discovery/Web-Content/directory-list-2.3-big.txt # Dirb classic big
Discovery/Web-Content/common.txt # Quick 4k common paths
Discovery/Web-Content/big.txt # 20k common paths
Discovery/Web-Content/raft-medium-directories.txt # Directories only
Discovery/Web-Content/raft-medium-files.txt # Files only
Discovery/Web-Content/raft-medium-extensions.txt # Extension enumeration
Discovery/Web-Content/SVNDigger/all.txt # SVN/code repos
Discovery/Web-Content/CMS/ # CMS-specific lists
Discovery/Web-Content/IIS.fuzz.txt # IIS-specific
Discovery/Web-Content/nginx.txt # Nginx-specific
API Endpoints
Discovery/Web-Content/api/api-endpoints.txt # Common API paths
Discovery/Web-Content/api/api-endpoints-res.txt # API resource patterns
Discovery/Web-Content/api/api-seen-in-wild.txt # Wild API endpoints
Discovery/Web-Content/api/objects.txt # API object names
Discovery/Web-Content/api/actions.txt # API action names
Discovery/Web-Content/api/graphql.txt # GraphQL endpoint paths
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 326 lines · 25 tokens per session scan A 18e45d72b065
wordlists is a skill published in the GitHub repository mukul975/Threatswarm (78 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 25 tokens to every session and 3,079 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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