Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add niels-emmer/myace --skill aws-identitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/niels-emmer/myaceWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/niels-emmer/myace/aws-identity)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/niels-emmer/myace/aws-identity"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/niels-emmer/myace/aws-identity/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/niels-emmer/myace/aws-identity"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/niels-emmer/myace/aws-identity.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00030 | $0.00847 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00424 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00169 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00085 |
Grade A, and why
AWS Identity Design scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 72 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Purpose
Identity is the security boundary in AWS. This skill is the AWS-specific
companion to iac-expert's "Managed Identity Over Long-Lived Secrets" rule:
it explains the identity options AWS offers, when to use each, and how to
design so that long-lived access keys are the exception, not the default.
When to use it
Any time you're designing or reviewing how an AWS workload authenticates — a new service, a service-to-service call, a CI/CD pipeline deploying to AWS, or a human accessing the console/CLI.
The identity options, and when to use each
IAM roles — the default for any AWS-hosted workload (EC2, ECS/EKS, Lambda, etc.). Attach an instance/task/execution role and AWS rotates the backing credentials automatically; your code just requests temporary credentials via the instance metadata/credentials endpoint. Use this for service-to-service access between AWS resources. Prefer a role with a narrowly-scoped trust policy over a shared role with broad permissions.
Identity federation — for non-AWS or external workloads (a GitHub Actions workflow, a Kubernetes cluster outside AWS, a third-party SaaS) that need to act as an AWS identity. Use OIDC federation (e.g. GitHub Actions OIDC) so the external workload's OIDC token is trusted directly — no access key exchanged. Use IAM Roles Anywhere for workloads outside AWS that can't do OIDC but still need temporary credentials. This is the modern replacement for long-lived access keys in CI/CD.
Long-lived access keys — the legacy option. Only acceptable when the target
genuinely has no role or federation option. If you must use one: store the
secret in Secrets Manager, reference it by ID, scope its IAM policy to least
privilege, and rotate it on a short, documented cadence. Treat any new access
key as a documented exception per iac-expert's exception-documentation
skill.
Human access — IAM users with MFA, or (better) identity federation to a corporate IdP (SSO). No shared accounts, no standing root credentials in code or config. Use IAM Identity Center (SSO) for just-in-time access to roles rather than permanent standing credentials.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 72 lines · 30 tokens per session scan A aed815cfab0e
AWS Identity Design is a skill published in the GitHub repository niels-emmer/myace (1 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 30 tokens to every session and 847 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other skills, from other repositories
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detecting-aws-iam-privilege-escalation
Detect AWS IAM privilege escalation paths using boto3 and Cloudsplaining policy analysis to identify overly permissive policies, dangerous permission combinations, and least-privilege violations.
cloud-iam-deep
GCP/AWS/Azure cloud exploitation -- Cloud Functions, Firestore, Cloud Run, S3, MinIO, Blob Storage, SA keys.
aws-security-audit
AWS security auditing — IAM users/roles/policies, CloudTrail API events, security posture analysis. Use when auditing IAM permissions, investigating security incidents, checking MFA compliance, or tracing API activity in CloudTrail.
Cloud Security & Container Hardening
AWS/Azure/GCP security auditing, container and Kubernetes hardening, Infrastructure as Code scanning, and cloud compliance assessment.
aws-essentials
Use when standing up the core AWS surface a small product needs: hardening a fresh account, a private S3 bucket, encrypted RDS Postgres, ECS Fargate vs EC2, CloudFront + OAC, or scoping an IAM policy to least privilege. NOT the CI pipeline that ships the container (that is deployment), NOT app-code access-control…