Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add nimadorostkar/Claude-Skills-collection --skill secure-codinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/nimadorostkar/Claude-Skills-collectionWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/nimadorostkar/claude-skills-collection/secure-coding)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/nimadorostkar/claude-skills-collection/secure-coding"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/nimadorostkar/claude-skills-collection/secure-coding/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/nimadorostkar/claude-skills-collection/secure-coding"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/nimadorostkar/claude-skills-collection/secure-coding.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00044 | $0.01255 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00022 | $0.00628 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00251 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00126 |
Grade A, and why
secure-coding scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 121 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Secure Coding
Purpose
Write code where the secure path is the default path. Most vulnerabilities are not clever — they are a string concatenated into a query, an authorization check that was never written, or a password hashed with the wrong algorithm.
When to Use
- Writing code that handles user input, authentication, or sensitive data.
- Implementing authorization.
- Handling passwords, tokens, or encryption.
- Reviewing code for vulnerabilities.
Capabilities
- Injection prevention: SQL, command, template, LDAP, XSS.
- Authentication: password storage, session management, MFA, token handling.
- Authorization: enforcing it at the right layer, and the object-level checks people forget.
- Cryptography: choosing the right primitive and not implementing it yourself.
- Secure defaults: headers, cookies, TLS.
Inputs
- The code, and where untrusted data enters it.
- The authentication and authorization model.
- Compliance requirements, if any.
Outputs
- Parameterized queries and encoded output, everywhere.
- Authorization enforced on every object access, not just at the route.
- Secrets and credentials handled with the correct primitives.
Workflow
- Identify the trust boundaries — Every place data enters from outside: HTTP, files, queues, environment, third-party APIs. Everything crossing one is untrusted, including data from your own other services.
- Parameterize, never concatenate — Every query, command, and template. String interpolation into SQL is the oldest vulnerability there is, and it is still the most common.
- Authorize on the object, not the route — A route guard checks that you are logged in. It does not check that this order belongs to you. Broken object-level authorization is the most prevalent API vulnerability in practice.
- Use the right crypto primitive — Argon2id or bcrypt for passwords. AES-GCM or libsodium for encryption. HMAC for signing. Never design your own scheme, and never use MD5, SHA-1, or plain SHA-256 for passwords.
- Fail closed — On error, deny. An authorization check that throws and is caught by a generic handler returning 200 has granted access.
- Set the defaults — Secure cookies, CSP, HSTS, and TLS configuration. These are one-time changes that eliminate whole vulnerability classes.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 121 lines · 44 tokens per session scan A 5d08a33c3a7c
secure-coding is a skill published in the GitHub repository nimadorostkar/Claude-Skills-collection (26 stars, last pushed 25d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 44 tokens to every session and 1,255 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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