Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add nimadorostkar/Claude-Skills-collection --skill threat-modelinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/nimadorostkar/Claude-Skills-collectionWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/nimadorostkar/claude-skills-collection/threat-modeling)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/nimadorostkar/claude-skills-collection/threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/nimadorostkar/claude-skills-collection/threat-modeling/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/nimadorostkar/claude-skills-collection/threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/nimadorostkar/claude-skills-collection/threat-modeling.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00041 | $0.01294 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00020 | $0.00647 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00259 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00129 |
Grade A, and why
threat-modeling scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 114 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Threat Modeling
Purpose
Find the security problems in a design before they are built. Threat modeling is cheap; the same finding after launch is a rewrite, and after a breach it is a disclosure.
When to Use
- Designing a new system or a significant feature.
- Adding a new trust boundary: a new integration, a new user role, a new data flow.
- Before a security review or a compliance audit.
- After an incident, to find the siblings of what just happened.
Capabilities
- Data-flow modeling and trust-boundary identification.
- STRIDE analysis: spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, elevation of privilege.
- Risk ranking by likelihood and impact.
- Mitigation design and acceptance of residual risk.
Inputs
- The design: components, data flows, and data stores.
- The assets worth protecting and to whom.
- The realistic attacker: an external attacker, a malicious tenant, a compromised dependency, a departing employee.
Outputs
- A data-flow diagram with trust boundaries marked.
- A ranked threat list with mitigations.
- Explicit acceptance of the risks not being mitigated.
Workflow
- Draw the data flow — Components, data stores, external entities, and the flows between them. Simple boxes and arrows; the diagram is a tool, not a deliverable.
- Mark the trust boundaries — Every line data crosses where the trust level changes: internet to your edge, your service to a third party, tenant A's data to tenant B's request. Threats live on these lines.
- Apply STRIDE at each boundary — For each flow, ask each of the six questions. It is mechanical, and that is the point: it finds what intuition skips.
- Rank by realistic risk — Likelihood times impact. A theoretical attack requiring physical access to the datacenter ranks below an IDOR that a bored user could find.
- Design mitigations — For each threat above the acceptance line, a specific control, with an owner.
- Accept the rest explicitly — Write down what you are not mitigating and why. Undocumented acceptance is indistinguishable from oversight.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 114 lines · 41 tokens per session scan A 68487bbdf07c
threat-modeling is a skill published in the GitHub repository nimadorostkar/Claude-Skills-collection (26 stars, last pushed 25d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 41 tokens to every session and 1,294 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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