Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to oasm-platform/open-asm. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/oasm-platform/open-asm/main/.agents/skills/ci-fix/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/oasm-platform/open-asmWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/oasm-platform/open-asm/ci-fix)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/oasm-platform/open-asm/ci-fix"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/oasm-platform/open-asm/ci-fix/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/oasm-platform/open-asm/ci-fix"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/oasm-platform/open-asm/ci-fix.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00014 | $0.00467 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00187 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00093 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00001 | $0.00047 |
Grade A, and why
ci-fix scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
The source is not reproduced here
Licensed GPL-3.0
The repository is licensed GPL-3.0, which this catalogue does not treat as permission to reproduce the file. Read it at the source.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 73 lines · 14 tokens per session scan A 0482c655368b
ci-fix is a skill published in the GitHub repository oasm-platform/open-asm (260 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed GPL-3.0. It adds 14 tokens to every session and 467 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
ci-security-scanning-with-strix
Add security scanning to CI/CD with Strix — GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, or any pipeline — so every pull request gets a diff-scoped AI pentest that blocks vulnerable code before it merges, with results as PR comments and SARIF uploaded to code scanning. Covers both the self-hosted open-source CLI (runs in your runner)…
cicd
CI/CD pipeline attack category — poisoned pipeline execution, GitHub Actions expression injection, self-hosted runner abuse, secrets/OIDC exfil. Routing skill: fingerprint the CI provider + workflow surface, then load the matching leaf.
github-actions-injection
GitHub Actions ${{ }} expression injection — attacker-controlled context (issue/PR title, body, branch name, commit message) substituted into run: steps, unsafe pullrequesttarget + PR-head checkout, GITHUBTOKEN scope abuse, artifact/cache poisoning, action tag-vs-SHA pinning.
poisoned-pipeline-execution
Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE) — direct + indirect: inject commands via attacker-controllable build files (Makefile, package.json scripts, build.gradle, Dangerfile, .pre-commit-config.yaml), abuse pullrequesttarget / fork-PR triggers, and ride dependency / test-script execution on CI.
dep-confusion
Dependency confusion — publish a higher-version internal package name on public registry (npm/PyPI/Maven/Crates) to coerce CI/CD into pulling attacker code.
detecting-shadow-api-endpoints
Discover and inventory shadow API endpoints that operate outside documented specifications using traffic analysis, code scanning, and API discovery platforms.