Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/oleg494/coding-kit/security-and-hardeningnpx skills add oleg494/coding-kit --skill security-and-hardeninggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/oleg494/coding-kitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/oleg494/coding-kit/security-and-hardening)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/oleg494/coding-kit/security-and-hardening"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/oleg494/coding-kit/security-and-hardening.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00065 | $0.01106 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00032 | $0.00553 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00221 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00111 |
Grade A, and why
security-and-hardening scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 129 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security and Hardening
Overview
Security-first development practices. Treat every external input as hostile, every secret as sacred, and every authorization check as mandatory.
When to Use
- Building anything that accepts user input
- Implementing authentication or authorization
- Storing or transmitting sensitive data
- Integrating with external APIs or services
- Adding file uploads, webhooks, or callbacks
- Handling payment or PII data
Process: Threat Model First
- Map the trust boundaries. Where does untrusted data cross into your system? HTTP requests, form fields, file uploads, webhooks, third-party APIs, message queues, LLM output.
- Name the assets. Credentials, PII, payment data, admin actions, money movement.
- Run STRIDE over each boundary:
- Spoofing → authentication, signature verification
- Tampering → integrity checks, parameterized queries, HTTPS
- Repudiation → audit logging
- Information disclosure → encryption, field allowlists, generic errors
- Denial of service → rate limiting, input size caps, timeouts
- Elevation of privilege → authorization checks, least privilege
The Three-Tier Boundary System
Always Do (No Exceptions)
- Validate all external input at system boundary
- Parameterize all database queries
- Encode output to prevent XSS
- Use HTTPS for all external communication
- Hash passwords with bcrypt/scrypt/argon2
- Set security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options)
- Use httpOnly, secure, sameSite cookies for sessions
Ask First (Requires Human Approval)
- Adding new authentication flows
- Storing new categories of sensitive data
- Adding new external service integrations
- Changing CORS configuration
- Adding file upload handlers
- Modifying rate limiting
Never Do
- Never commit secrets to version control
- Never log sensitive data (passwords, tokens, full credit cards)
- Never trust client-side validation as a security boundary
- Never use
eval()orinnerHTMLwith user-provided data - Never store sessions in client-accessible storage
- Never expose stack traces to users
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 129 lines · 65 tokens per session scan A 3f67ba80b8a3
security-and-hardening is a skill published in the GitHub repository oleg494/coding-kit (1 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 65 tokens to every session and 1,106 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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