ConnectOnion is an open-source, template-first toolkit for building, debugging, deploying, and operating AI agents. Developers use its command-line tools and Python runtime to create agents, add tools, connect services, deploy them, and make them callable by other agents, while the catalogue entries are related agents, skills, and instructions.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add openonion/connectonion --skill co-browsergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/openonion/connectonionWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/openonion/connectonion/co-browser)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/openonion/connectonion/co-browser"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/openonion/connectonion/co-browser/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/openonion/connectonion/co-browser"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/openonion/connectonion/co-browser.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00063 | $0.04009 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00025 | $0.01604 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00802 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00401 |
Grade A, and why
co-browser scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 23d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 322 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
co browser Skill
Drive one real browser from the shell. The browser stays open between commands —
cookies and logins persist until co browser close. Every terminal on the machine
talks to the same daemon: one browser, one board, no matter where you type.
Read the output as well as the exit code. A selector that matched nothing
exits 1 and no browser open exits 3, so co browser ... && next_step stops
where it should — but a click that landed on the wrong element still exits 0,
and only the page (a screenshot, get_text) can tell you that.
Step 1: Identity — who are you?
The daemon attributes every tab to a caller and uses that identity to stop two
agents from silently driving the same page. Set CO_WHO explicitly — shell
state does not survive between your tool calls, so a lone export is lost.
Either prefix every command:
CO_WHO=alice co browser go_to example.com
or keep the export and the commands in the SAME shell invocation:
export CO_WHO=alice && co browser go_to example.com && co browser get_text
(Some environments — e.g. Claude Code background jobs — are auto-identified,
but setting CO_WHO is always safe and never worse.) An anonymous caller still
works but gets no contention protection.
Step 2: Check the board, then claim a tab
One task = one tab. Before touching the browser, see what's already happening:
co browser status # browser state, headless flag, last command, the board
co browser tab ls # every tab: who owns it, purpose, last command (--json for scripting)
Solo (nobody else on the board) — bare commands run on the shared main tab, no ceremony:
co browser go_to example.com # runs on 'main'
co browser get_text # still 'main'
Concurrent (another agent or a second parallel task exists) — open your own tab
and add -t <name> to EVERY command, including a quoted task. Pick an explicit literal tab
name — a NAME=$(...) capture is lost between tool calls:
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 23d ago Changed · +5 lines 5794096eebda
- 24d ago Changed · -2 lines 18a357b3c380
- 25d ago Changed · +3 lines 1449f7788355
- 26d ago Changed · +20 lines eaf1125adfc5
- 1mo ago Changed · +17 lines a62b159e9c1e
- 1mo ago Changed · +4 lines 02de053f8420
- 1mo ago First seen · 275 lines · 63 tokens per session scan A 9a2d9346253e
co-browser is a skill published in the GitHub repository openonion/connectonion (1,500 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 63 tokens to every session and 4,009 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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