threat-modeling

threat-modeling is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from Oriolshhh/runware-image-mcp. It costs 18 tokens per session (496 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A structured security review that maps what must be protected, who could attack it, where trust changes, and how an attack might happen.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to assess changes involving authentication, user input, command or filesystem access, generated files, dependencies, or untrusted instructions.
Why use it?
It turns broad security concerns into ranked threats with specific fixes, especially when work handles untrusted input, secrets, commands, files, or dependencies.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one. Also seen: installed under .agents/ (shared by several agents).

Good fit Use it to assess changes involving authentication, user input, command or filesystem access, generated files, dependencies, or untrusted instructions.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/oriolshhh/runware-image-mcp/threat-modeling
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add Oriolshhh/runware-image-mcp --skill threat-modeling
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Oriolshhh/runware-image-mcp

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for threat-modeling

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/oriolshhh/runware-image-mcp/threat-modeling/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/oriolshhh/runware-image-mcp/threat-modeling)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/oriolshhh/runware-image-mcp/threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/oriolshhh/runware-image-mcp/threat-modeling/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for threat-modeling

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/oriolshhh/runware-image-mcp/threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/oriolshhh/runware-image-mcp/threat-modeling.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 18 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 496 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00018 $0.00496
Opus 5 $0.00009 $0.00248
Sonnet 5 $0.00004 $0.00099
Haiku 4.5 $0.00002 $0.00050

Measured 8d ago against content hash dde6cc4fab39, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-11, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

threat-modeling scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.agents/skills/threat-modeling/SKILL.md · 51 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 51 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Threat Modeling

Purpose

Reason systematically about how a change could be abused, so security findings are concrete and prioritized rather than generic.

When to use it

  • For changes touching untrusted input, auth, secrets, filesystem/command execution, dependencies, generated-file ownership, or untrusted instructions.
  • During the /council security review.

Instructions

  1. List the assets worth protecting (data, credentials, integrity of generated files, execution surface).
  2. List the actors (users, other services, malicious input, compromised deps) and the entry points they reach.
  3. Draw the trust boundaries the change crosses; note where untrusted data becomes trusted.
  4. Enumerate misuse cases: injection, traversal/symlink escape, privilege misuse, secret exposure, supply-chain tampering, prompt injection.
  5. For each realistic threat, give the exploit path, severity, and a concrete mitigation. Separate vulnerabilities (exploitable now) from optional hardening.
  6. Decide whether a fuller, standalone threat model is warranted.

Output format

A threat model: assets, actors, entry points, trust boundaries, ranked threats (each with exploit path, severity, mitigation), vulnerabilities vs. hardening, and residual risk.

Anti-patterns

  • Generic checklists with no exploit path or repository evidence.
  • Labelling optional hardening as a live vulnerability (or vice versa).
  • Naming secret values instead of the configuration key or source.
  • Stopping at "validate input" without identifying the specific sink.

Verification checklist

  • Trust boundaries and entry points are explicit.
  • Each threat has an exploit path, severity, and concrete mitigation.
  • Vulnerabilities and hardening are clearly separated.
  • The need for a formal threat model is decided, with reasons.

Apply context-discovery before broad scanning: use a supplied context capsule first; otherwise check context frontmatter freshness, read .agent/context/routing.md, load only relevant summaries, and verify critical claims against source.

Read the full file on GitHub · 51 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 8d ago First seen · 51 lines · 18 tokens per session scan A dde6cc4fab39

Subscribe to this mod's changes

threat-modeling is a skill published in the GitHub repository Oriolshhh/runware-image-mcp (0 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 18 tokens to every session and 496 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.

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