memory-sanitize

Redact PII and scan for credentials in memory files — write copies to /tmp, never touch originals.

Scope

Memory-dir-only. Does not read session histories. Structural audit (orphans, duplicates) belongs in memory-clean; run that first if the directory is messy. This skill is a best-effort redactor, not a formal DLP tool — the user is the final reviewer.

Path resolution

SKILL_SCRIPTS="${MEMORY_SANITIZE_SKILL_SCRIPTS:-$HOME/.claude/claude/skills/memory-sanitize/scripts}"
MEMORY_DIR=$("$SKILL_SCRIPTS/resolve-paths.sh" memory_dir)

SESSION_HISTORY_GLOB is not used by this skill. Abort on non-zero exit. Override MEMORY_SANITIZE_SKILL_SCRIPTS if installed outside $HOME/.claude.

Workflow

1. Resolve memory dir (above)

2. Run sanitizer

DST="/tmp/memory-sanitized-$(date +%s)"
"$SKILL_SCRIPTS/sanitize-memory.sh" "$MEMORY_DIR" "$DST"

The script writes redacted copies under $DST/ and emits a JSON report to stdout:

{
  "files": [
    { "source": "feedback_foo.md", "redactions": 3, "credentials": 0 },
    { "source": "MEMORY.md",       "redactions": 1, "credentials": 1 }
  ],
  "total_redactions": 4,
  "total_credentials": 1
}

Read references/REDACTION-RULES.md for the full pattern table and severity tiers.

3. Show diff and credential hits

difft "$MEMORY_DIR" "$DST"

For each file with credential hits, show the specific line(s) with the hit pattern highlighted. If any credential remains in the source originals (zero redaction applied despite a credential pattern match), abort with a critical warning and recommend the user manually remediate the original before sharing.

4. Present to user

Render:

Sanitized N files → $DST
  N redactions applied (paths, emails, session IDs, dates)
  N credential hits (see above)

Original files are unchanged. Review the diff before sharing.

Wait for user acknowledgement before exiting.

Boundary fences

• Read-only on originals. Writes only to /tmp/memory-sanitized-<ts>/.
• Does not update MEMORY.md in the originals — sanitized copies are not a replacement.
• Does not read session histories.
• Security limitation: pattern-based scanning misses novel or obfuscated formats — the user is the final reviewer before sharing.