Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add oyi77/1ai-skills --skill langchain-patternsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/oyi77/1ai-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/oyi77/1ai-skills/langchain-patterns)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/oyi77/1ai-skills/langchain-patterns"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/oyi77/1ai-skills/langchain-patterns/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/oyi77/1ai-skills/langchain-patterns"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/oyi77/1ai-skills/langchain-patterns.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00035 | $0.01758 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00703 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00352 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00176 |
Grade A, and why
langchain-patterns scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 273 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Overview
LangChain is the most widely used framework for building LLM applications. LangGraph adds stateful, multi-actor workflows with cycles. Together they provide chains, agents, retrieval, memory, and complex workflow orchestration.
Capabilities
- Build chains with LCEL (LangChain Expression Language)
- Create agents with tool use and reasoning
- Implement RAG with vector stores and retrievers
- Manage conversation memory and context
- Build graph-based workflows with LangGraph
- Integrate with 100+ LLM providers and tools
When to Use
Trigger phrases:
-
"langchain patterns"
-
"LangChain/LangGraph patterns — chains, agents, tools, memory, retrieval, graph w"
-
Building LLM-powered applications (chatbots, RAG, agents)
-
Needing structured chains for multi-step LLM workflows
-
Building stateful agent workflows with branching logic
-
Implementing retrieval-augmented generation
-
Wanting a mature ecosystem with many integrations
When NOT to Use
- Task is outside your authorization scope
- You need to implement controls (use implementing-* skills)
- Task is about analysis, not action (use analyzing-* skills)
- You don't have access to target systems
- Task requires compliance expertise (consult professionals)
- Task is about defense, not offense (use defensive skills)
Pseudo Code
# Example workflow for this skill
def execute(input_data):
# Step 1: Validate input
if not input_data:
raise ValueError("Input data is required")
# Step 2: Process core logic
result = process(input_data)
# Step 3: Validate output
validate_output(result)
return result
LCEL Chain
from langchain_openai import ChatOpenAI
from langchain_core.prompts import ChatPromptTemplate
from langchain_core.output_parsers import StrOutputParser
llm = ChatOpenAI(model="gpt-4o")
prompt = ChatPromptTemplate.from_messages([
("system", "You are a helpful assistant."),
("user", "{input}"),
])
chain = prompt | llm | StrOutputParser()
result = chain.invoke({"input": "Explain quantum computing in simple terms."})
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 273 lines · 35 tokens per session scan A dce4d5390a33
langchain-patterns is a skill published in the GitHub repository oyi77/1ai-skills (17 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 35 tokens to every session and 1,758 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
dify
Use when building LLM applications with visual workflow — RAG knowledge bases, AI agents, chatbots with drag-and-drop orchestration. Dify: open-source LLM app platform supporting 30+ models (OpenAI, Claude, DeepSeek, Ollama, Qwen, GLM) with Docker deployment.
ai-skills
Use when building LLM applications, RAG knowledge bases, AI agents, terminal coding agents, multi-model orchestration, plugin-based agent harnesses, or file translation. Index of 14 skills: Dify, LangChain, LlamaIndex, Ollama, Transformers, Hermes Agent, OpenClaw, OpenCode, Pi, DocuTranslate, DeepSeek Harness and more.
knowledge-org
A guide to organising large bodies of knowledge so an AI system can navigate relationships, summaries, and layers instead of searching only flat text chunks. It covers tree indexes, knowledge graphs, file-like structures, incremental updates, and long-term memory layouts.
vector-and-embedding-weaknesses
Hunt vector / embedding weaknesses (OWASP LLM08:2025) — adversarial inputs against the RAG / similarity layer that cause cross-tenant leak, embedding-inversion privacy loss, semantic confusion, and retriever-driven prompt injection.
sensitive-information-disclosure
Hunt LLM sensitive-information disclosure (OWASP LLM02:2025) — leakage of PII, secrets, internal source, model details, and other-tenant data through model outputs, training-data extraction, or retrieval-side joins.
aatmf-t12-rag-poisoning
AATMF T12 — RAG & Knowledge Base Manipulation. PoisonedRAG, vector store flood, embedding collision, retrieval-bias attacks.