Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Phaedra-Solutions/cursor-rules --skill incident-supply-chaingit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Phaedra-Solutions/cursor-rulesWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/phaedra-solutions/cursor-rules/incident-supply-chain)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/phaedra-solutions/cursor-rules/incident-supply-chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/phaedra-solutions/cursor-rules/incident-supply-chain/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/phaedra-solutions/cursor-rules/incident-supply-chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/phaedra-solutions/cursor-rules/incident-supply-chain.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00107 | $0.02648 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00043 | $0.01059 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00021 | $0.00530 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00265 |
Grade E, and why
incident-supply-chain scanned grade E with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Harvests environment variableshighData exfiltration
Enumerating or grepping the environment for keys collects credentials unrelated to what the mod says it does.
| Shai-Hulud | npm, Sep 2025 | `postinstall` → `bundle.js`; TruffleHog to harvest secrets | Repo named `Shai-Hulud`; workflow `shai-hulud-workflow.yml` | Recursive force deletehighDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
- **Order matters.** Since Mini Shai-Hulud (May 2026) and ChainDrop (Aug 2026), worms install a token monitor that polls GitHub with the stolen token and wipes the home directory (`rm -rf ~/`) when the token is revoked. How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 110 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Supply-chain incident
When to use
- A package, GitHub Action, container image or developer tool you use is reported malicious or compromised.
security-audit,cve-checkordependency-vetfinds aMAL-entry or a GitHub malware advisory.- You notice signs of an install-time attack: an unexpected
preinstall/postinstallscript, new workflow files, unknown repos or runners on the user's account, or edited AI-assistant or editor config.
Before you start
- Tell the user plainly that this is a security incident, and recommend involving their security team now.
- Collect what's known: package and ecosystem, malicious versions, exposure window (UTC), and the source of the report. Confirm it with OSV or GHSA (see
cve-check). - Order matters. Since Mini Shai-Hulud (May 2026) and ChainDrop (Aug 2026), worms install a token monitor that polls GitHub with the stolen token and wipes the home directory (
rm -rf ~/) when the token is revoked. Miasma (Oct 2026) also wipes on revocation. So: isolate, then remove persistence, then rotate from a clean machine. - Every step that changes accounts, credentials, CI or history is the user's action or needs their explicit approval. You investigate and prepare commands.
Steps
- Stop the spread.
- Stop all installs, builds and dev servers on affected machines. Don't run any package scripts.
- Pause CI that installs dependencies or publishes:
gh workflow disable <workflow>per repo, with the user's approval. Pause release and deploy pipelines. - If malware may have run on a machine, disconnect it from the network but keep it powered on for evidence. Do the rest of the investigation on it offline, or from a clean machine.
- Scope the exposure.
-
Find every lockfile that resolves an affected version:
grep -rn --include='package-lock.json' --include='pnpm-lock.yaml' --include='yarn.lock' --include='bun.lock' --include='uv.lock' --include='poetry.lock' --include='requirements*.txt' 'PACKAGE' . npm ls PACKAGE --all # or: pnpm why PACKAGE / yarn why PACKAGE / uv tree --package PACKAGE osv-scanner scan source -r . # flags any MAL- entries across all lockfiles
-
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 110 lines · 107 tokens per session scan E cf46d7309c3c
incident-supply-chain is a skill published in the GitHub repository Phaedra-Solutions/cursor-rules (4 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 107 tokens to every session and 2,648 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it E with 2 findings (harvests environment variables, recursive force delete). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-11-01.
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