Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Phaedra-Solutions/cursor-rules --skill threat-model-litegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Phaedra-Solutions/cursor-rulesWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/phaedra-solutions/cursor-rules/threat-model-lite)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/phaedra-solutions/cursor-rules/threat-model-lite"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/phaedra-solutions/cursor-rules/threat-model-lite/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/phaedra-solutions/cursor-rules/threat-model-lite"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/phaedra-solutions/cursor-rules/threat-model-lite.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00095 | $0.01546 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00038 | $0.00618 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00309 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00155 |
Grade A, and why
threat-model-lite scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 86 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Threat model lite
When to use
- Before building a feature that touches auth, money, files, personal data, an external integration, an LLM or agent, or adds a public endpoint.
- When
core/security-baseline(A06) asks for abuse cases. - When the user asks for a threat model or security design review.
It's a short design check, not a full threat model. For regulated systems or high-value targets, recommend a full threat-modeling session with the team.
Before you start
You need two inputs. Ask for whichever is missing; infer from the code only what you can confirm.
-
Feature description: what it does, who uses it (anonymous, signed-in, admin, other services), and what "done" looks like.
-
Data flows: where data enters, which components handle it, where it's stored, and which external services it reaches. A bullet list is enough:
browser → POST /api/invoices/:id/pdf (Next.js Server Action) → invoices table (Postgres, RLS) Server Action → PDF service (internal HTTP) → S3 private bucket → signed URL back to browser
Also check the existing auth model, tenancy model and the stack rules that apply.
Steps
Spend about 10 minutes. Prefer three concrete threats over ten generic ones.
-
Assets. List what an attacker would want: data (personal data, payment data, secrets, tokens), capabilities (sending email, spending money, running code, calling an LLM with tools) and availability.
-
Entry points and trust boundaries. List every place untrusted input crosses into the system: endpoints, Server Actions, webhooks, file uploads, queue consumers, LLM inputs (including retrieved documents and tool output), and admin screens. Mark where trust changes (browser → server, service → third party, tenant → tenant).
-
STRIDE pass. For each entry point, ask one question per letter and keep only the threats that apply:
STRIDE Question Typical controls Spoofing Can someone act as another user, service or webhook sender? Proven auth, verified webhook signatures, mTLS or signed service tokens Tampering Can someone change data, prices, IDs, files or prompts they shouldn't? Server-side validation, object-level authorization, integrity checks Repudiation Could someone deny doing a sensitive action? Structured audit log with actor, action, resource, result Information disclosure Can data leak across users or tenants, or through errors, logs, URLs or LLM output? Tenant-scoped queries, response DTOs, generic errors, redaction Denial of service Can someone exhaust money, quota, CPU, storage or a third-party limit? Rate limits, quotas, size and time bounds, spend caps Elevation of privilege Can a user reach admin functions, other tenants, or code execution (injection, SSRF, tool abuse)? Deny by default, least privilege, parameterized queries, allowlists, human approval for risky tool calls
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 86 lines · 95 tokens per session scan A 378a8dd5d826
threat-model-lite is a skill published in the GitHub repository Phaedra-Solutions/cursor-rules (4 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 95 tokens to every session and 1,546 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-11-01.
Other skills, from other repositories
grok-cli
Delegate bounded tasks to Grok Build from a supervising agent such as Codex. Use when the user asks Grok to investigate, review, implement, or provide another perspective, or when a distinct coding agent would materially help. Includes a background ACP client for progress, follow-up prompts, permissions, and…
documentation
Use when the user asks to install or maintain a documentation index, keep CLAUDE.md or AGENTS.md inventories synchronized with files, add document metadata, classify documentation, or apply documentation-only setup to a repository.
talk-like-scarletkc
A writing guide that makes text sound like the developer scarletkc, including posts, comments, technical opinions, project documents, and translations.
product-writing
Write, edit, or review UI copy, CLI messages, help text, code comments, and technical documentation covering product behavior, errors, status, setup, compatibility, or technical results.
marketing-copy
Write outbound promotional copy for a product or project: launch and update posts for community platforms and social media, store page descriptions and short blurbs, landing page headlines and calls to action, press-style announcements, and the naming of a product for another language or market. Covers what may be…
scoped-change
Judgment rules for locating the correct boundary of a requested change: staying inert outside it while completing every required site inside it. Use when scope is ambiguous, a diff touches neighboring surfaces, required dependent edits are unclear, or a proposed compatibility layer, migration, fallback, flag…