Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PlamenTSV/plamen --skill cosmos-ibc-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PlamenTSV/plamenWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/cosmos-ibc-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/cosmos-ibc-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/plamentsv/plamen/cosmos-ibc-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/cosmos-ibc-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/plamentsv/plamen/cosmos-ibc-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00058 | $0.03462 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00029 | $0.01731 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00692 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00346 |
Grade A, and why
cosmos-ibc-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 132 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Injectable Skill: Cosmos IBC Security
L1 trigger:
L1_PATTERN=trueANDIBC(ibc-go //ibc// ics23 / IBC channels detected) Inject Into:depth-consensus-invariant,depth-externalLanguage: Go (Cosmos-SDK / ibc-go) Finding prefix:[IBC-N]Status: v0.1
Orchestrator Decomposition Guide
- Sections 1, 4: depth-external (cross-chain proof / version trust boundary — the bytes that cross the chain boundary)
- Sections 2, 3, 5: depth-consensus-invariant (channel sequence, escrow accounting, handler reentrancy — all chain-state / safety class)
- A single bug can span both lenses; record it once and cross-reference.
When This Skill Activates
Recon detects an IBC integration: go.mod requires github.com/cosmos/ibc-go/..., the tree has an /ibc/ subtree, an ics23 / 23-commitment / 02-client / 04-channel path, or IBC application modules (OnRecvPacket, OnAcknowledgementPacket, OnTimeoutPacket, IBCModule impls). IBC is the trust boundary where bytes from a foreign chain enter local state via a verified proof — proof-verification gaps and packet-handler bugs are the highest-severity class here (forged value acceptance, fund theft, chain halt). Severity baseline is Medium; proof-bypass / fund-loss / chain-halt classes upgrade to High/Critical per docs/l1-mode/severity-matrix.md.
An IBC entry path is any code reachable from OnRecvPacket, OnAcknowledgementPacket, OnTimeoutPacket, OnChanOpenInit/Try/Ack/Confirm, OnChanCloseInit/Confirm, a relayer-submitted MsgRecvPacket / MsgAcknowledgement / MsgTimeout / MsgUpdateClient, or any keeper method consuming a commitment proof. Everything in those paths consumes attacker-influenceable bytes (the relayer is untrusted; the counterparty chain may be malicious) and MUST verify proofs against the correct path/prefix before acting.
1. Merkle / ICS-23 Proof Verification
Check: Every consumption of a cross-chain value must verify a full membership (or non-membership) proof against the counterparty's committed root, using the correct commitment path PREFIX and validating the emitter / source is the expected chain/channel. A proof verified against the wrong path, with a missing prefix, or without binding the value to the expected source, lets a forged value pass (ICS-23 / Dragonberry-class).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 132 lines · 58 tokens per session scan A 91ad9cdb0275
cosmos-ibc-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository PlamenTSV/plamen (294 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 58 tokens to every session and 3,462 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
analyzing-ethereum-smart-contract-vulnerabilities
Perform static and symbolic analysis of Solidity smart contracts using Slither and Mythril to detect reentrancy, integer overflow, access control, and other vulnerability classes before deployment to Ethereum mainnet.
prowler-tour
Keeps product-tour definitions aligned with the UI features they describe. Trigger: When modifying UI components that have associated tours, editing tour definition files, or renaming data-tour-id attributes.
analyzing-ethereum-smart-contract-vulnerabilities
Perform static and symbolic analysis of Solidity smart contracts using Slither and Mythril to detect reentrancy, integer overflow, access control, and other vulnerability classes before deployment to Ethereum mainnet.
evm-bytecode-analysis
Analyze supplied deployed EVM runtime bytecode with EVMole or guide a separate application in integrating a published EVMole Rust, Go, Python, or JavaScript binding. Use for unverified-contract inspection, ABI reconstruction from runtime code, selector discovery, storage-access analysis, EVM control-flow inspection…
talos-action-development
Develop, modify, review, and maintain standalone Talos actions in contracts/tasks/actions, including chain guardrails, contract bindings, transaction safety, schedules, action catalogues, and Talos documentation. Use when adding an action, changing an action’s behavior or parameters, updating a Talos schedule, or…
web3-poc-foundry
Complete Foundry PoC writing guide + all cheatcodes + DeFiHackLabs reproduction patterns. Use this when building a proof of concept exploit, setting up a fork test, using Foundry cheatcodes, or reproducing a known DeFi hack for learning.