Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PlamenTSV/plamen --skill custom-type-safetygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PlamenTSV/plamenWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/custom-type-safety)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/custom-type-safety"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/plamentsv/plamen/custom-type-safety/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/custom-type-safety"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/plamentsv/plamen/custom-type-safety.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00024 | $0.01983 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00992 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00397 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00198 |
Grade A, and why
custom-type-safety scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 146 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
CUSTOM_TYPE_SAFETY Skill (Soroban)
Trigger Pattern:
contractimport!or#[contracttype]detected in codebase Inject Into: Breadth agents, depth-external Finding prefix:[CT-N]Rules referenced: R4, R8, R10
Soroban contracts interact with external contracts through generated client bindings (contractimport!) and pass structured data across boundaries using #[contracttype] types. Both mechanisms carry security-relevant assumptions about versioning, type stability, and deserialization behavior that must be verified.
1. Import Dependency Audit
For every contractimport! macro invocation, identify what is being imported and whether it is pinned:
| Import Target | File/Path or Wasm Hash | Version Pinned? | Pinning Method | Stable? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
contractimport!("{target}") |
{resolved path or hash} |
YES/NO | Hash / Path / None | YES/NO |
Pinning methods (strongest to weakest):
- WASM hash:
contractimport!(file = "...", sha256 = "0xabc...")— exact bytecode pinning, most secure - Specific file path in repo: deterministic if the file is version-controlled alongside the contract
- Dynamic path or URL: fetched at build time, non-deterministic — flag as HIGH risk
Checks:
- Is the imported contract itself audited / trusted?
- Does the import target a well-known protocol (e.g., the Stellar DEX, a lending protocol)? If so, any upgrade to that protocol silently changes the interface the importing contract relies on.
- For imported WASM: is the hash pinned in the build manifest? If the WASM file is replaced without updating the hash, the build fails (good). If no hash is required, the build silently uses a new version.
2. Type Boundary Safety
When values of #[contracttype] types cross contract boundaries via invoke_contract, the receiving contract must be able to deserialize them. Verify semantic meaning is preserved:
| Type | Crosses Boundary? | Sending Contract Version | Receiving Contract Version | Compatibility? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
{StructName} |
YES/NO | {version or hash} |
{version or hash} |
YES/NO |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 146 lines · 24 tokens per session scan A daa8a01b3305
custom-type-safety is a skill published in the GitHub repository PlamenTSV/plamen (295 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 24 tokens to every session and 1,983 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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