Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PlamenTSV/plamen --skill ref-lifecyclegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PlamenTSV/plamenWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/ref-lifecycle)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/ref-lifecycle"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/plamentsv/plamen/ref-lifecycle/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/ref-lifecycle"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/plamentsv/plamen/ref-lifecycle.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00035 | $0.03271 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00014 | $0.01308 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00654 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00327 |
Grade A, and why
ref-lifecycle scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 244 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Skill: Reference Lifecycle Analysis
Type: Thought-template (instantiate before use) Trigger Pattern: Always (Aptos Move) -- ConstructorRef/TransferRef/MintRef/BurnRef lifecycle Inject Into: Breadth agents, depth-state-trace, depth-token-flow Research basis: Aptos Object model capability-based access control, permanent reference semantics
Background
In Aptos Move, object capabilities (Refs) are unforgeable tokens that grant specific permissions over objects. Unlike role-based access control in EVM, Refs are permanent once created -- they CANNOT be revoked. A leaked or improperly stored Ref grants permanent capability to its holder.
Key Ref types:
- ConstructorRef: Created once during
object::create_*. Parent of all other Refs. Grants ability to generate TransferRef, MintRef, BurnRef, DeleteRef, and ExtendRef. - TransferRef: Grants ability to transfer an object even when its
TransferRefis frozen. Bypassesungated_transferrestrictions. - MintRef: Grants ability to mint FungibleAsset. Unlimited minting if held.
- BurnRef: Grants ability to burn FungibleAsset from any FungibleStore.
- DeleteRef: Grants ability to delete an object.
- ExtendRef: Grants ability to generate a signer for the object, enabling further resource manipulation.
Trigger Patterns
ConstructorRef|TransferRef|MintRef|BurnRef|DeleteRef|ExtendRef|
object::create_named_object|object::create_sticky_object|object::create_object|
fungible_asset::generate_mint_ref|fungible_asset::generate_burn_ref|
fungible_asset::generate_transfer_ref|object::generate_delete_ref|
object::generate_extend_ref|object::generate_transfer_ref
Reasoning Template
Step 1: Reference Inventory
Enumerate ALL Ref types found in the codebase. For each:
| Ref Type | Created In (module::function) | Stored Location | Access Control | Capability Granted |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ConstructorRef | {module}::{init_fn} | {consumed / stored in resource} | {who can access} | Generate all other Refs |
| MintRef | {module}::{init_fn} | {global resource at @addr} | {who can access} | Unlimited minting of {asset} |
| BurnRef | {module}::{init_fn} | {global resource at @addr} | {who can access} | Burn {asset} from any store |
| TransferRef | {module}::{init_fn} | {global resource at @addr} | {who can access} | Transfer {asset} bypassing freeze |
| DeleteRef | {module}::{init_fn} | {global resource at @addr} | {who can access} | Delete {object} |
| ExtendRef | {module}::{init_fn} | {global resource at @addr} | {who can access} | Generate signer for {object} |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 244 lines · 35 tokens per session scan A b08d01ddd0d5
ref-lifecycle is a skill published in the GitHub repository PlamenTSV/plamen (306 stars, last pushed 21d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 35 tokens to every session and 3,271 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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