ref-lifecycle

A security review guide for Aptos Move object references, which are unforgeable tokens granting permissions such as minting, burning, transferring, or deleting objects.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to trace how ConstructorRef, TransferRef, MintRef, BurnRef, DeleteRef, and ExtendRef are created, stored, passed, and used.
Why use it?
These references cannot be revoked, so a leaked or incorrectly stored reference can give its holder lasting control.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/plamentsv/plamen/ref-lifecycle
Any agent
npx skills add PlamenTSV/plamen --skill ref-lifecycle
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PlamenTSV/plamen

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Per session 35 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 3,271 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00035 $0.03271
Opus 5 $0.00017 $0.01636
Sonnet 5 $0.00007 $0.00654
Haiku 4.5 $0.00003 $0.00327

Measured 2d ago against content hash b08d01ddd0d5, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

ref-lifecycle scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

agents/skills/aptos/ref-lifecycle/SKILL.md · 244 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 244 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Skill: Reference Lifecycle Analysis

Type: Thought-template (instantiate before use) Trigger Pattern: Always (Aptos Move) -- ConstructorRef/TransferRef/MintRef/BurnRef lifecycle Inject Into: Breadth agents, depth-state-trace, depth-token-flow Research basis: Aptos Object model capability-based access control, permanent reference semantics

Background

In Aptos Move, object capabilities (Refs) are unforgeable tokens that grant specific permissions over objects. Unlike role-based access control in EVM, Refs are permanent once created -- they CANNOT be revoked. A leaked or improperly stored Ref grants permanent capability to its holder.

Key Ref types:

  • ConstructorRef: Created once during object::create_*. Parent of all other Refs. Grants ability to generate TransferRef, MintRef, BurnRef, DeleteRef, and ExtendRef.
  • TransferRef: Grants ability to transfer an object even when its TransferRef is frozen. Bypasses ungated_transfer restrictions.
  • MintRef: Grants ability to mint FungibleAsset. Unlimited minting if held.
  • BurnRef: Grants ability to burn FungibleAsset from any FungibleStore.
  • DeleteRef: Grants ability to delete an object.
  • ExtendRef: Grants ability to generate a signer for the object, enabling further resource manipulation.

Trigger Patterns

ConstructorRef|TransferRef|MintRef|BurnRef|DeleteRef|ExtendRef|
object::create_named_object|object::create_sticky_object|object::create_object|
fungible_asset::generate_mint_ref|fungible_asset::generate_burn_ref|
fungible_asset::generate_transfer_ref|object::generate_delete_ref|
object::generate_extend_ref|object::generate_transfer_ref

Reasoning Template

Step 1: Reference Inventory

Enumerate ALL Ref types found in the codebase. For each:

Ref Type Created In (module::function) Stored Location Access Control Capability Granted
ConstructorRef {module}::{init_fn} {consumed / stored in resource} {who can access} Generate all other Refs
MintRef {module}::{init_fn} {global resource at @addr} {who can access} Unlimited minting of {asset}
BurnRef {module}::{init_fn} {global resource at @addr} {who can access} Burn {asset} from any store
TransferRef {module}::{init_fn} {global resource at @addr} {who can access} Transfer {asset} bypassing freeze
DeleteRef {module}::{init_fn} {global resource at @addr} {who can access} Delete {object}
ExtendRef {module}::{init_fn} {global resource at @addr} {who can access} Generate signer for {object}

Read the full file on GitHub · 244 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 244 lines · 35 tokens per session scan A b08d01ddd0d5

Subscribe to this mod's changes

ref-lifecycle is a skill published in the GitHub repository PlamenTSV/plamen (281 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 35 tokens to every session and 3,271 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

Related

Other skills, from other repositories

prowler-ui

Prowler UI-specific patterns. For generic patterns, see: typescript, react-19, nextjs-16, tailwind-4. Trigger: When working inside ui/ on Prowler-specific conventions (shadcn, folder placement, actions/adapters, shared types/hooks/lib).

prowler-cloud/prowler · 64 tokens

prowler-test-api

Testing patterns for Prowler API: JSON:API, Celery tasks, RLS isolation, RBAC. Trigger: When writing tests for api/ (JSON:API requests/assertions, cross-tenant isolation, RBAC, Celery tasks, viewsets/serializers).

prowler-cloud/prowler · 62 tokens

prowler-pr

Creates Pull Requests for Prowler following the project template and conventions. Trigger: When working on pull request requirements or creation (PR template sections, PR title Conventional Commits check, changelog gate/no-changelog label), or when inspecting PR-related GitHub workflows like conventional-commit.yml…

prowler-cloud/prowler · 84 tokens

tailwind-4

Tailwind CSS 4 patterns and best practices. Trigger: When styling with Tailwind (className, variants, cn()), especially when dynamic styling or CSS variables are involved (no var() in className).

prowler-cloud/prowler · 47 tokens

prowler-commit

Creates professional git commits following conventional-commits format. Trigger: When creating commits, after completing code changes, when user asks to commit.

prowler-cloud/prowler · 33 tokens

react-19

React 19 patterns with React Compiler. Trigger: When writing React 19 components/hooks in .tsx (React Compiler rules, hook patterns, refs as props). If using Next.js App Router/Server Actions, also use nextjs-16.

prowler-cloud/prowler · 53 tokens