Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PlamenTSV/plamen --skill token-2022-extensionsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PlamenTSV/plamenWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/token-2022-extensions)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/token-2022-extensions"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/plamentsv/plamen/token-2022-extensions/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/plamentsv/plamen/token-2022-extensions"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/plamentsv/plamen/token-2022-extensions.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00040 | $0.01420 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00020 | $0.00710 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00284 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00142 |
Grade A, and why
token-2022-extensions scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 126 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
TOKEN_2022_EXTENSIONS Skill
Trigger Pattern: TOKEN_2022 flag detected (token_2022/spl_token_2022/transfer_checked usage) Inject Into: Breadth agents, depth agents Finding prefix:
[T22-N]Rules referenced: S9, R3, R11
For every token mint the program interacts with that may use Token-2022:
1. Extension Inventory
For each mint:
| Mint | Token Program | Extensions Detected | Extension Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| {mint} | token / token-2022 | {list: TransferFee, TransferHook, PermanentDelegate, MintCloseAuthority, DefaultAccountState, etc.} | {brief per-extension impact} |
Detection: Check if program uses spl_token_2022 or token_2022 imports. Check mint account data length (Token-2022 mints are larger due to extension data).
2. Extension Allowlist
Does the program explicitly check which extensions are supported?
| Check | Present? | Location | Missing Extensions Handled? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Extension allowlist / blocklist | YES/NO | {line} | {what happens with unsupported extension} |
Attack (S9): Program designed for basic SPL Token interacts with Token-2022 mint that has unexpected extensions (e.g., PermanentDelegate). Program doesn't check → extension silently affects behavior. Defense: Explicitly check mint extensions and reject unsupported ones.
3. Permanent Delegate Risk
For each mint with PermanentDelegate extension:
| Mint | Permanent Delegate | Trust Level | Vault Drain Scenario | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| {mint} | {delegate pubkey} | {trusted/untrusted/unknown} | {can delegate drain vault?} | {what prevents it} |
Attack: Permanent delegate can transfer tokens FROM any token account of that mint, without the account owner's approval. If protocol holds tokens of a PermanentDelegate mint → delegate can drain them at any time.
4. Transfer Hook Analysis
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 126 lines · 40 tokens per session scan A 1a20410287bf
token-2022-extensions is a skill published in the GitHub repository PlamenTSV/plamen (295 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 40 tokens to every session and 1,420 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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