Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/pyramidheadshark/claude-scaffold/github-actionsnpx skills add pyramidheadshark/claude-scaffold --skill github-actionsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/pyramidheadshark/claude-scaffoldWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/pyramidheadshark/claude-scaffold/github-actions)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/pyramidheadshark/claude-scaffold/github-actions"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/pyramidheadshark/claude-scaffold/github-actions.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00899 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00449 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00180 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00090 |
Grade A, and why
github-actions scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 146 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
GitHub Actions Patterns
When to Load This Skill
Load when working with: .github/workflows/*.yml, CI pipelines, lint/test/build/deploy jobs, matrix strategies, GitHub secrets, environment protection rules.
Keywords: github actions, ci, workflow, lint job, test job, deploy, matrix, pipeline
Canonical Job Templates
Lint (ruff + mypy)
lint:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v4
with:
version: "latest"
- run: uv sync --frozen
- run: uv run ruff check .
- run: uv run mypy src/
Test (pytest + coverage)
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: lint
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@v4
with:
version: "latest"
- run: uv sync --frozen
- run: uv run pytest --cov=src --cov-report=xml --cov-fail-under=80
- uses: codecov/codecov-action@v4
with:
token: ${{ secrets.CODECOV_TOKEN }}
Docker Build & Push
docker-build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: test
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
- uses: docker/login-action@v3
with:
registry: cr.yandex
username: json_key
password: ${{ secrets.YC_SA_JSON_CREDENTIALS }}
- uses: docker/build-push-action@v5
with:
context: .
push: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
tags: cr.yandex/${{ secrets.YC_REGISTRY_ID }}/app:${{ github.sha }}
cache-from: type=gha
cache-to: type=gha,mode=max
Deploy to Yandex Cloud
deploy:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: docker-build
environment: production
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
steps:
- uses: yc-actions/yc-cr-login@v2
with:
yc-sa-json-credentials: ${{ secrets.YC_SA_JSON_CREDENTIALS }}
- name: Deploy to YC Serverless Container
run: |
yc serverless container revision deploy \
--container-name ${{ vars.CONTAINER_NAME }} \
--image cr.yandex/${{ secrets.YC_REGISTRY_ID }}/app:${{ github.sha }} \
--service-account-id ${{ secrets.YC_SA_ID }}
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 146 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A d0b68921039e
github-actions is a skill published in the GitHub repository pyramidheadshark/claude-scaffold (4 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 899 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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