Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add rahmanef63/si-coder-agent --skill sc-cfgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/rahmanef63/si-coder-agentWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/rahmanef63/si-coder-agent/sc-cf)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/rahmanef63/si-coder-agent/sc-cf"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/rahmanef63/si-coder-agent/sc-cf/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/rahmanef63/si-coder-agent/sc-cf"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/rahmanef63/si-coder-agent/sc-cf.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 155 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 85 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 298 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00086 | $0.06192 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00034 | $0.02477 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00017 | $0.01238 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00619 |
Grade A, and why
sc-cf scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 307 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/sc-cf — Cloudflare
Status: DNS is implemented (
lib/cloudflare.js+scripts/dns.js). Workers, Pages, R2 and Zero Trust tunnel are not implemented — see Not implemented yet.
flowchart TD
A["/sc-cf set --domain be.example.com"] --> B["resolve zone<br/>longest suffix wins<br/>(or CLOUDFLARE_ZONE_ID pin)"]
B --> C["GET /zones/:id/dns_records<br/>?type=A&name.exact=be.example.com"]
C --> D{"exact name+type<br/>matches?"}
D -->|"0"| E["POST /dns_records<br/>proxied:false"]
D -->|"1, content+proxied ok"| F["no-op ✅<br/>{ alreadyExists: true }"]
D -->|"1, wrong"| G["PATCH /dns_records/:recordId<br/>that ONE id"]
D -->|">1"| H["refuse ⚠️<br/>{ skipped:true, reason:'ambiguous' }"]
E --> I["settle 5s, then ✅<br/>{ skipped:false, created:true }"]
G --> I
When to use
- The domain's nameservers point at Cloudflare. That is the whole deciding factor — see Hostinger vs Cloudflare.
- You need a subdomain A record so Traefik/Dokploy can obtain a Let's Encrypt certificate (the driving case).
/sc-allneeds a DNS provider andCLOUDFLARE_API_TOKENis set —configureDnshere is signature-compatible withlib/hostinger.js.
Scope (implemented)
lib/cloudflare.js is the client; skills/sc-cf/scripts/dns.js is the CLI over it.
- Zone resolution — longest-matching-suffix probe (
GET /zones?name=<candidate>, longest-first), so a delegatedsub.example.comzone beats its parent. Falls back to paginated enumeration (per_page=50, hard cap 20 pages) when a token's listing ignores the name filter. - Idempotent record sync —
configureDnsRecordno-ops when the record already matches on content,proxiedandttl, PATCHes one record id when it doesn't, POSTs when it's absent. Never throws. An explicit--ttlonsetis therefore applied to an otherwise-matching record (lowering TTL ahead of a planned cutover actually takes effect). - Target validation before anything destructive — an
Atarget must be a dotted-quad IPv4,AAAAan IPv6,CNAMEa hostname. Checked before the zone lookup, so a malformed target costs no API call and — crucially — can never cost the clashing record that would have been deleted to make room for it.TXTcontent is arbitrary and is not shape-checked. - Recoverable clash removal — when a clash is deleted and the replacement create then fails, the removed record is re-created (best effort) and the result carries
destroyed/restored/priorRecords.skipped: truenever silently means "a live record was destroyed". - Per-record CRUD —
listRecords/createRecord/updateRecord/deleteRecord, all bound by the same 15s abort timeout that stays armed across the body read. The unfiltered record listing is paginated (per_page=100, hard cap 20 pages) for the same reason zone enumeration is: a single page silently truncates, anddeletewould then report a record past row 100 as "not found in zone". An exactname+typelookup stays one request. - A↔CNAME clash handling — removes the one clashing record found by an exact name+type lookup. TXT is exempt (SPF/DKIM/ACME challenges legitimately coexist).
/sc-alldrop-in —configureDns({ fullDomain, dokployApiUrl })resolves the Dokploy host to an IPv4 (family:4+ dotted-quad guard) and writes the A record.
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · +15 lines f96b4554839f
- 1mo ago First seen · 292 lines · 86 tokens per session scan A 628364bd205b
sc-cf is a skill published in the GitHub repository rahmanef63/si-coder-agent (13 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 86 tokens to every session and 6,192 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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