Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add rana/skills --skill threat-modelgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/rana/skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/rana/skills/threat-model)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/rana/skills/threat-model"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/rana/skills/threat-model/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/rana/skills/threat-model"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/rana/skills/threat-model.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00060 | $0.00910 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00024 | $0.00364 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00182 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00091 |
Grade A, and why
threat-model scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 81 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Read all project markdown documents and examine the codebase to ground in the project's actual architecture — not a generic checklist.
Threat Model
Phase 1: Asset Inventory
Identify what the system protects:
- Data assets — What data exists? What's its sensitivity classification? Content, credentials, PII, embeddings, metadata, logs, analytics.
- Computational assets — What services process data? What are their cost structures? Which have variable cost (API calls, compute)?
- Reputation assets — What trust does the system hold? Brand, content integrity, user confidence, regulatory standing.
Phase 2: Trust Boundaries
Map where trust changes:
- External → internal — User input entering the system. Browser → API. Crawler → content. Upload → processing pipeline.
- Internal → external — System calling third-party services. API keys leaving the boundary. Data sent to processors.
- Privilege transitions — Anonymous → authenticated. Editor → admin. Development → production. Human-approved → auto-served.
- Temporal boundaries — Build-time vs. runtime. Ingestion-time vs. serve-time. Cache-warm vs. cache-cold.
Phase 3: Data Flow Analysis
Trace sensitive data through the system:
- Where does it enter? Where is it stored? Where is it processed? Where does it exit?
- At each hop: is it encrypted? Is it validated? Is it logged? Is it retained?
- What happens to data at each trust boundary crossing?
Phase 4: STRIDE Threat Enumeration
For each trust boundary and data flow, evaluate:
| Category | Question |
|---|---|
| Spoofing | Can an attacker impersonate a legitimate entity? |
| Tampering | Can data be modified in transit or at rest without detection? |
| Repudiation | Can actions be performed without accountability? |
| Information Disclosure | Can sensitive data leak through errors, logs, timing, or side channels? |
| Denial of Service | Can the system be made unavailable or prohibitively expensive to operate? |
| Elevation of Privilege | Can an attacker gain capabilities beyond their authorization level? |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 81 lines · 60 tokens per session scan A f80c94771561
threat-model is a skill published in the GitHub repository rana/skills (1 stars, last pushed 6mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 60 tokens to every session and 910 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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