Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/admin-interface-securitynpx skills add RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skills --skill admin-interface-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/admin-interface-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/admin-interface-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/admin-interface-security.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00029 | $0.00370 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00185 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00074 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00037 |
Grade A, and why
admin-interface-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Model Registry Administrative Interface Security
Security Requirement
If the model registry has an administrative interface, only identified, authenticated, and authorized users MUST be able to connect to it.
Required Controls
| Control | Description |
|---|---|
| Identification | Every admin user must have a unique identity (no shared accounts) |
| Authentication | Standard authentication mechanism (OIDC/OAuth 2.1 recommended) |
| Authorization | RBAC or ABAC to control which admin operations each user can perform |
| Multi-factor authentication | MFA recommended for administrative access |
| Session management | Short-lived sessions with automatic timeout |
Admin Operations to Protect
| Operation | Risk |
|---|---|
| Model upload/publish | Introducing malicious or backdoored models |
| Model deletion | Removing approved models, causing service disruption |
| Access control changes | Granting unauthorized users access to models |
| Configuration changes | Weakening security settings |
| Registry metadata modification | Altering model provenance information |
Implementation Checklist
- Require authentication for all administrative access (no anonymous admin)
- Integrate with OIDC Identity Provider for admin authentication
- Implement RBAC with least-privilege roles for admin operations
- Enforce MFA for admin accounts
- Use short-lived sessions with automatic timeout
- Log all administrative actions with the authenticated user's identity
- Restrict admin interface to internal networks or VPN unless external access is a documented requirement
- Disable default/shared admin accounts
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 44 lines · 29 tokens per session scan A d2d670be20b0
admin-interface-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skills (52 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 29 tokens to every session and 370 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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