Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/richfrem/agent-plugins-skillsnpx agentmods add skills/richfrem/agent-plugins-skills/agt-securityWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/richfrem/agent-plugins-skills/agt-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/richfrem/agent-plugins-skills/agt-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/richfrem/agent-plugins-skills/agt-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/richfrem/agent-plugins-skills/agt-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/richfrem/agent-plugins-skills/agt-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00030 | $0.00546 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00218 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00109 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00055 |
Grade A, and why
agt-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 18d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 56 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Agentic Group Theory Security (agt-security)
Manages local execution sandboxes, verifies process hygiene limits, and rotates cryptographic HMAC bus keys under Agentic Group Theory (AGT).
Contents
Critical Constraints
- Environment Hygiene: Ensure banned execution variables (
PYTHONPATH,PYTHONHOME,LD_PRELOAD,DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH) are scrubbed before subprocess launch. - Path Containment: Ensure filesystem operations outside declared root boundaries raise explicit
PermissionErrorexceptions. - Key Permission Enforcement: HMAC session keys must be created exclusively with
0600permissions inside protected secret storage (context/exploration/.secrets/). - Zero Key Leakage: Never print, log, or leak raw HMAC key bytes to stdout, telemetry, or conversational outputs.
Quick start
# Verify sandbox hygiene and path containment
python3 plugins/cli-agents/scripts/agt_ops.py verify-sandbox
# Rotate local HMAC session signing key
python3 plugins/cli-agents/scripts/agt_ops.py rotate-key
Workflow
- Phase 1: Environment Hygiene Check: Run
agt_ops.py verify-sandboxto verify environment variable sanitization in subprocess runners. - Phase 2: Boundary Containment Verification: Confirm that path containment rules trigger
PermissionErrorwhen accessing out-of-bounds directories. - Phase 3: Cryptographic Key Rotation: Execute
agt_ops.py rotate-keyto generate a 32-byte cryptographically secure HMAC session key with0600mode. - Phase 4: Permission Verification: Verify file mode permissions on
session_hmac.keyto ensure unauthorized read access is prevented.
Verification
# Run sandbox verification
python3 plugins/cli-agents/scripts/agt_ops.py verify-sandbox
# Audit skill compliance
python3 plugins/agent-scaffolders/scripts/audit_skill.py plugins/cli-agents/skills/agt-security --mode source
What ships with it
5 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 18d ago Changed · +18 lines 2ea0459852e9
- 1mo ago First seen · 38 lines · 30 tokens per session scan A 8a3bded974b0
agt-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository richfrem/agent-plugins-skills (7 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 30 tokens to every session and 546 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
autoprompt
Run explicitly requested Autoprompt v2 work through the private controller. Ordinary coding and review requests do not activate this skill.
autoprompt
Run explicitly requested Autoprompt v2 work through the private controller. Ordinary coding and review requests do not activate this skill.
ap-route-analyst
Inspect only enough read-only project information to recommend a route and list the facts behind that recommendation.
ap-roadmap-author
Write one dependency-ordered roadmap with owners, integration points, success items, and real checks.
ap-depth-prober
Report the compatibility redirect to ap-worker; this retired role cannot perform new work.
ap-fresh-verifier
Report the compatibility redirect to ap-independent-checker; this retired role cannot perform new work.