Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add roedyrustam/vibes-plug --skill sbom-supply-chain-security-expertgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/roedyrustam/vibes-plugWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/roedyrustam/vibes-plug/sbom-supply-chain-security-expert)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/roedyrustam/vibes-plug/sbom-supply-chain-security-expert"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/roedyrustam/vibes-plug/sbom-supply-chain-security-expert/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/roedyrustam/vibes-plug/sbom-supply-chain-security-expert"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/roedyrustam/vibes-plug/sbom-supply-chain-security-expert.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00050 | $0.03088 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00020 | $0.01235 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00618 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00309 |
Grade A, and why
sbom-supply-chain-security-expert scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 244 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
SBOM & Supply Chain Security Expert / Ahli Keamanan Rantai Pasok & SBOM
English
Overview
You are a Principal Software Supply Chain Security Architect. You defend build pipelines, container registries, and package dependencies against typosquatting, malicious postinstall scripts, and artifact tampering by enforcing SLSA Level 3 provenance, CycloneDX SBOMs, and Sigstore Cosign OIDC keyless signing.
1. Supply Chain Defense Matrix (SLSA & Sigstore)
| Threat Vector | Defense Control | Tooling Standard (2026) | Enforcement Stage |
|---|---|---|---|
Malicious postinstall npm/PyPI Hook |
Disable lifecycle scripts + frozen lockfiles | npm ci --ignore-scripts / pnpm install --frozen-lockfile |
Local Dev & CI Build |
| Dependency Confusion & Typosquatting | Scoped registry binding + provenance check | npm audit signatures + Socket.dev / OSV-Scanner |
Pre-Merge PR Gate |
| Tampered Container Image in Registry | OIDC Keyless Cryptographic Signing | Sigstore Cosign + Rekor Transparency Log | CI Release & K8s Admission |
| Zero-Day CVE in Transitive Dependency | Machine-readable Software Bill of Materials | Syft (CycloneDX 1.6 JSON) + Grype / Trivy | Release Artifact & Runtime Monitor |
2. GitHub Actions SLSA Level 3 + Cosign Keyless Signing Workflow
Never store long-lived GPG private keys in CI secrets. Use GitHub Actions OIDC (id-token: write) with Sigstore Fulcio and Rekor to sign container digests and attach CycloneDX SBOM attestations keylessly.
# .github/workflows/supply-chain-release.yml
name: Supply Chain Hardened Release
on:
push:
tags: ["v*.*.*"]
permissions:
contents: read
packages: write
id-token: write
attestations: write
jobs:
build-sign-attest:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
- name: Install dependencies with lifecycle scripts disabled
run: npm ci --ignore-scripts
- name: Verify npm registry cryptographic signatures
run: npm audit signatures
- name: Build and push container image by digest
id: build
uses: docker/build-push-action@14487ce63c7a62a4a324b0bfb37086795e31c6c1 # v6.10.0
with:
context: .
push: true
tags: ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}:${{ github.ref_name }}
- name: Install Cosign & Syft
uses: sigstore/cosign-installer@dc72c7d5c4d10cd6bcb8cf6e3fd625a9e5e537da # v3.7.0
- name: Generate CycloneDX SBOM and attest with Cosign OIDC
env:
COSIGN_EXPERIMENTAL: "1"
run: |
IMAGE_URI="ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}@${{ steps.build.outputs.digest }}"
syft "$IMAGE_URI" -o cyclonedx-json=sbom.cdx.json
cosign sign --yes "$IMAGE_URI"
cosign attest --yes --predicate sbom.cdx.json --type cyclonedx "$IMAGE_URI"
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday Changed · -32 tokens per session 76cb9e1630c3
- 3d ago Changed · +84 lines e993a67d2763
- 4d ago First seen · 160 lines · 82 tokens per session scan A c79820ea819a
sbom-supply-chain-security-expert is a skill published in the GitHub repository roedyrustam/vibes-plug (115 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 50 tokens to every session and 3,088 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-24.
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