Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add rube-de/cc-skills --skill securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/rube-de/cc-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/rube-de/cc-skills/security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/rube-de/cc-skills/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/rube-de/cc-skills/security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/rube-de/cc-skills/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/rube-de/cc-skills/security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 122 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 124 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 122 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00040 | $0.02129 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00852 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00426 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00213 |
Grade A, and why
security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 186 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
DLC: Security Scan
Run security checks against the current project and create a GitHub issue with findings.
Before running, read ../dlc/references/ISSUE-TEMPLATE.md now for the issue format, and read ../dlc/references/REPORT-FORMAT.md now for the findings data structure.
Step 1: Detect Project Type
Scan the repository root for project indicators:
| Indicator | Project Type | Primary Tool |
|---|---|---|
package.json / package-lock.json / bun.lockb |
Node.js | npm audit / bun audit |
requirements.txt / pyproject.toml / Pipfile |
Python | pip-audit |
Cargo.toml |
Rust | cargo audit |
go.mod |
Go | govulncheck |
pom.xml / build.gradle |
Java/Kotlin | dependency-check |
Gemfile |
Ruby | bundler-audit |
If multiple indicators exist, treat as a monorepo and scan each.
Step 2: Run Security Tools
For each detected project type, run tools in this priority order. Use the first available tool; skip unavailable ones.
Dependency Audit
Select the tool based on availability (command -v), not exit codes — audit tools exit non-zero when vulnerabilities are found, which is a valid result to capture.
# Node.js — select by availability
if command -v npm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
npm audit --json 2>/dev/null
elif command -v bun >/dev/null 2>&1; then
bun audit 2>/dev/null
fi
# Python
command -v pip-audit >/dev/null 2>&1 && pip-audit --format=json 2>/dev/null
# Rust
command -v cargo-audit >/dev/null 2>&1 && cargo audit --json 2>/dev/null
# Go
command -v govulncheck >/dev/null 2>&1 && govulncheck ./... 2>/dev/null
Dependency Staleness
Check for packages significantly behind the latest stable release — these accumulate security patches without formal CVEs.
Select tools based on availability (command -v), not exit codes — staleness tools exit non-zero when outdated packages are found, which is a valid result to capture.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 186 lines · 40 tokens per session scan A c2ee8ccf4e19
security is a skill published in the GitHub repository rube-de/cc-skills (10 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 40 tokens to every session and 2,129 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other skills, from other repositories
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Use when the CTO describes a feature, task, or project goal. Orchestrates the full SDLC pipeline automatically based on project type.
opportunity-solution-tree
Build an Opportunity Solution Tree (OST) to structure product discovery — map a desired outcome to customer opportunities, possible solutions, and experiments. Based on Teresa Torres' Continuous Discovery Habits. Use when the team is unclear what to build next, when multiple opportunities compete, or before writing a…
skeptical-triage
Reusable 3-round self-challenge + arbiter pattern for filtering false positives from findings/verdicts. Use when the cost of a false-positive gate block exceeds the cost of 4 extra LLM turns.
anti-patterns
Catalogue of known SDLC anti-patterns that greatcto agents must actively reject when reviewing architecture, plans, code, or post-mortems. Used by architect (pre-impl), pm (planning), senior-dev (impl), l3-support (post-incident).
cost-model
Standardized cost-estimation framework for greatcto plans. Forces explicit LLM cost, infra cost, human-supervision time, and the (defensible) human-equivalent comparison. Output format is parsable by the board's /api/cost path — must follow exactly.
done-blocked
Reusable reporting contract for any agent that hands work back to the pipeline. Forces ONE of two terminal statuses (DONE or BLOCKED) with a specific evidence shape. Stops vague "probably finished" and "kind of stuck" verdicts.