skillshare is a command-line tool that keeps AI coding-agent skills, agents, rules, commands, prompts, and other file-based resources synchronized from one source across many AI CLI tools. Individuals and teams use it to share and manage these resources across projects and organizations. The catalogue entries are skillshare commands and skills.
Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/runkids/skillsharenpx agentmods add skills/runkids/skillshare/skillshare-cli-e2e-testWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/runkids/skillshare/skillshare-cli-e2e-test)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/runkids/skillshare/skillshare-cli-e2e-test"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/runkids/skillshare/skillshare-cli-e2e-test/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/runkids/skillshare/skillshare-cli-e2e-test"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/runkids/skillshare/skillshare-cli-e2e-test.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 12 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Rogue Agent · line 192 Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.Fix: Prevent the skill from modifying its own code, SKILL.md, or configuration files. Treat skill files as read-only at runtime.
- high Tool Misuse · line 207 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 207 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 207 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 217 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 217 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 217 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 78 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 215 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 311 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 312 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 313 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00127 | $0.04964 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00051 | $0.01986 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00025 | $0.00993 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00496 |
Grade C, and why
skillshare-cli-e2e-test scanned grade C with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 24d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Recursive force deletehighDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
- [ ] **`--init` creates default extras** — `ssenv create --init` creates a `rules` extra by default. Runbooks that assume an empty extras list must add cleanup first: `ss extras remove rules --force -g 2>/dev/null || tr How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 389 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Run isolated E2E tests in devcontainer. $ARGUMENTS specifies runbook name or "new".
Before acting, run python3 scripts/ai-context.py testing. The topic is the source of truth for isolation, runbook quality and reporting rules; this skill retains the execution flow and mdproof recipes.
Flow
Phase 0: Environment Check
-
Confirm devcontainer is running and get container ID:
CONTAINER=$(docker compose -f .devcontainer/docker-compose.yml ps -q skillshare-devcontainer)- If empty → prompt user:
docker compose -f .devcontainer/docker-compose.yml up -d - Ensure
CONTAINERis set for all subsequentdocker execcalls.
- If empty → prompt user:
-
Confirm Linux binary is available:
docker exec $CONTAINER bash -c \ '/workspace/.devcontainer/ensure-skillshare-linux-binary.sh && ss version' -
Confirm mdproof is installed:
docker exec $CONTAINER /workspace/.devcontainer/ensure-mdproof.shThis auto-installs from GitHub release, or falls back to
/workspace/bin/mdproof(local dev binary). -
Check for lessons learned from previous runs:
test -f /workspace/.mdproof/lessons-learned.md && cat /workspace/.mdproof/lessons-learned.mdIf the file exists, read it before writing or debugging runbooks — it contains known gotchas and assertion patterns.
Phase 1: Detect Scope
-
Preview all available runbooks via the container:
docker exec $CONTAINER mdproof --dry-run --report json /workspace/ai_docs/tests/This returns JSON with every runbook's steps, commands, and expected assertions — no manual markdown parsing needed. Use this to understand what each runbook covers.
-
Identify recent changes (unstaged + recent commits):
git diff --name-only HEAD~3 -
Match changes to relevant runbooks (compare changed file paths against step commands in the JSON output).
Phase 2: Select Tests
Prompt user (via AskUserQuestion):
- Option A: Run existing runbook (list all available + mark those related to recent changes)
- Option B: Auto-generate new test script based on recent changes
- Option C: If $ARGUMENTS specifies a runbook, skip to Phase 3
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 24d ago Changed · -31 lines be0e3be48025
- 1mo ago First seen · 420 lines · 127 tokens per session scan C 85aba5c402b0
skillshare-cli-e2e-test is a skill published in the GitHub repository runkids/skillshare (2,804 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 127 tokens to every session and 4,964 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it C with 1 finding (recursive force delete). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
cli-tmux
Use tmux to run and test our interactive CLI/TUI end-to-end. Includes how to start, send keys, capture output, and cleanly stop (double Ctrl+C).
e2e-testing
Guide for running end-to-end tests of the Qwen Code CLI, including headless mode, MCP server testing, and API traffic inspection. Use this skill whenever you need to verify CLI behavior with real model calls, reproduce user-reported bugs end-to-end, test MCP tool integrations, or inspect raw API request/response…
verify
Exercise the real app/API/CLI and collect observable evidence; tests alone do not count as end-to-end verification.
webapp-testing
Start/reuse a local app, wait for readiness, inspect rendered state/console/network, act from observed selectors, and verify with evidence.
winui-ui-testing
Write and run automated UI tests for Windows desktop apps (WinUI 3, WPF, WinForms, Win32) with the winapp ui harness: one batch script, assertions, input, file pickers, dialogs, screenshots, locally or in Windows Sandbox. Use when asked for UI tests or to verify a feature end to end.
tui-test
Control, inspect, test, and record real terminal apps with the tui-test CLI or its Rust, Python, and JavaScript APIs. Use for shells, TUI apps, text and style locators, keyboard or mouse input, terminal state, clipboard waits, screenshots, recordings, snapshots, and live terminal sessions.