Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add s0ld13rr/pentestcode --skill exploitationgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/s0ld13rr/pentestcodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/exploitation)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/exploitation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/exploitation/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/exploitation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/exploitation.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00036 | $0.00749 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00300 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00150 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00075 |
Grade A, and why
exploitation-phase scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 40 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Exploitation — Prove Impact, Don't Break Things
Golden rule: the goal is a DEMONSTRATED impact for the report, not maximum damage. Prefer the least destructive proof (file read > RCE > data exfil).
Web → load the matching web-* skill
SQLi (web-sqli), SSTI (web-ssti), SSRF (web-ssrf), LFI (web-lfi-traversal), upload RCE (web-upload-rce), XXE (web-xxe), auth bypass/IDOR (web-auth-bypass-idor), deserialization (web-deserialization). Router + payload index: playbook-webapp.
sqlmap --batch --level 3 --risk 2only after a manual injection point is confirmed.- Public PoC for a known CVE: fetch, READ IT, adapt to the exact version — never blind-run exploit binaries.
Network
- Capture:
tcpdump -i eth0 -w cap.pcap 'host X'/ Wireshark — creds in cleartext protocols (FTP, HTTP basic, SNMP) are findings on their own. - MITM/relay: ARP spoofing only on flat L2 segments with authorization; NTLM relay requires SMB signing disabled (checked in enumeration).
- Responder + ntlmrelayx are the standard authorized chain: LLMNR/NBT-NS poison → relay to SMB/ADCS/LDAP.
- Impacket suite covers the rest:
GetNPUsers.py(AS-REP),GetUserSPNs.py(kerberoast),secretsdump.py,psexec.py/wmiexec.py(lateral).
Credential attacks — lockout-aware ALWAYS
# Spray: ONE password across MANY users, never the reverse
nxc smb DC -u users.txt -p 'Summer2024!' --continue-on-success
hydra -L users.txt -p 'CommonPass1!' target https-post-form '/login:user=^PASS^:F=invalid'
- Respect lockout policy (enumerate it via
netexec ... --pass-polfirst). A locked-out user base = failed test. - Cracking offline:
hashcat -m 1000(NTLM),-m 18200(AS-REP),-m 13100(TGS),-m 22000(WPA). John as fallback. Rockyou + rules; custom wordlist from client context (org name, products, local slang).
Wireless
- Monitor-mode capture →
aircrack-ng -w rockyou cap.cap(WPA2 handshake) or PMKID (hcxdumptool). - Evil twin / deauth = disruptive; ONLY with written authorization, never on client production SSIDs during business hours.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago Changed · -59 lines · +6 tokens per session scan B → A 12aae374a7db
- 2mo ago First seen · 99 lines · 30 tokens per session scan B d3e8d4c8d015
exploitation-phase is a skill published in the GitHub repository s0ld13rr/pentestcode (921 stars, last pushed 12d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 36 tokens to every session and 749 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
lictor-security-check
Pre-release security audit for ANY project — AI-built or hand-written, web or mobile. Scans the codebase for the full range of real-world risks that get apps breached: leaked API & AI-provider keys, exposed configs/secrets, broken auth & access control (IDOR), injection (SQL/XSS/command), SSRF, open databases & cloud…
lictor-rotate
Walks the user through rotating a leaked API key — step by step, provider-specific. Knows the exact URL to visit, the exact button to click, and how to verify the rotation worked. Supports Stripe, OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Cloud / AI Studio, GitHub, AWS, Slack, Supabase, Firebase, Postmark, and generic OAuth providers.
lictor-explain
Takes any security finding, error message, or jargon-heavy security advice and explains it in plain English. Use this when someone is confused by what /lictor-security-check found, or when they got a security warning from another tool and don't understand it.
openai-patterns
Production OpenAI API patterns — model selection, prompt engineering, function calling, streaming, error handling, cost control, and structured outputs.
lictor-fix-it
Applies the fixes recommended by /lictor-security-check, with the user's explicit permission for each change. Walks through findings one at a time, shows the proposed change, gets approval, applies, runs tests if available, and moves on. Some fixes (rotating leaked credentials) require the user to act outside Claude …
html-artifacts
Author the HTML for a plan artifact, dashboard iframe, or Slack attachment — structure, design plan, available runtime, theming, and craft. Read this before writing HTML for publishartifact, outputiframe, or slackattachhtml.