Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add s0ld13rr/pentestcode --skill mobile-iosgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/s0ld13rr/pentestcodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/mobile-ios)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/mobile-ios"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/mobile-ios/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/mobile-ios"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/mobile-ios.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00066 | $0.00656 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00026 | $0.00262 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00131 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00066 |
Grade A, and why
svc-mobile-ios scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 39 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
iOS IPA Static Analysis
Pair with svc-mobile-android concepts — same audit axes, Apple-specific mechanics.
Reverse engineering
# Decrypt (FairPlay) if App Store binary: ipsw / clutch / frida-ios-dump
# Class/object dump
class-dump -H BinaryName # headers from Mach-O
Hopper / Ghidra for control flow
strings -a BinaryName | grep -iE 'key|token|secret|password|api'
otool -l BinaryName | grep -A4 LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO # cryptid 1 = still encrypted
Checklist (mirrors OWASP Mobile Top 10)
- Secrets: hardcoded API keys in
Info.plist,*.strings, binaries (strings + nm). Filter bundle IDs / public Firebase keys as non-issues — private keys and backend secrets count. - ATS:
NSAllowsArbitraryLoads=truein Info.plist = cleartext allowed (High). Per-domain exceptions → note which domains. - Keychain: what's stored, with which accessibility (
kSecAttrAccessibleAlways= leak on jailbreak). Data Protection class per file (NSFileProtectionComplete?). - Local storage: UserDefaults / SQLite / CoreData / Realm for tokens & PII — unencrypted = finding.
- Jailbreak detection: file checks, scheme checks, fork() — document bypassability (Frida bypass = detection is bypassed, still note it as a control).
- Reverse-tamper: only jailbreak checks, no integrity/signature verification of own binary?
- Exported schemes:
CFBundleURLTypes— custom URL handlers accepting unvalidated input (deep-link injection, auth bypass likemyapp://reset?token=) - Pasteboard / screenshots: sensitive screens with
isSecureTextEntrymissing, screenshot in app switcher. - Transport: certificate pinning present? (check for AFSecurityPolicy/TrustKit/pinning libs — absence on a banking/health app = finding)
- Privacy manifests:
NSUserTrackingUsageDescription, excessiveNS*UsageDescriptionvs actual functionality.
Dynamic (when in scope)
Frida: frida -U -f com.bundle.id -l script.js — hook NSURLSession to log traffic, bypass pinning (ssl-kill-switch2), dump Keychain.
objection: objection explore — root/jailbreak detection bypass, clipboard monitor, cookie dump.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 39 lines · 66 tokens per session scan A a6f6d27f6b03
svc-mobile-ios is a skill published in the GitHub repository s0ld13rr/pentestcode (883 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 66 tokens to every session and 656 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-24.
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