Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add s0ld13rr/pentestcode --skill sshgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/s0ld13rr/pentestcodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/ssh)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/ssh"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/ssh/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/ssh"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/ssh.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00064 | $0.00337 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00026 | $0.00135 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00067 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00034 |
Grade C, and why
svc-ssh scanned grade C with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Reaches for credential fileshighPrivilege escalation
SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.
- `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` — who else has access (persistence opportunity) What it actually says
SSH — Version CVEs & Tricks
CVE-2024-6387 (regreSSHion)
OpenSSH 8.5–9.7 on glibc-based Linux. Race condition → unauthenticated RCE. Public PoCs exist but are slow/unreliable — confirm version, note as high-value finding.
CVE-2018-15473 (user enumeration)
OpenSSH <7.7. Timing-based username enumeration.
ssh-audit TARGET or Metasploit auxiliary/scanner/ssh/ssh_enumusers.
User list → password spray / AS-REP roast.
SSH agent forwarding hijack
If another user has agent forwarding enabled:
find /tmp -name "agent.*" → SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/tmp/agent.XXXX ssh other-target
Post-auth pivot intel
~/.ssh/config— other hosts, jump hosts, proxy configs~/.ssh/known_hosts— every host this user connected to~/.ssh/authorized_keys— who else has access (persistence opportunity)
Auth method check
ssh -o PreferredAuthentications=none TARGET reveals accepted methods.
If only publickey → password brute is impossible, don't waste time on hydra.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · -34 lines · -9 tokens per session scan D → C 3a6e0de28f0c
- 1mo ago First seen · 63 lines · 73 tokens per session scan D 2e11a791a6fa
svc-ssh is a skill published in the GitHub repository s0ld13rr/pentestcode (849 stars, last pushed 14d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 64 tokens to every session and 337 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it C with 1 finding (reaches for credential files). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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