Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add s0ld13rr/pentestcode --skill webappgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/s0ld13rr/pentestcodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/webapp)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/webapp"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/webapp/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/webapp"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/s0ld13rr/pentestcode/webapp.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00078 | $0.00673 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00031 | $0.00269 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00135 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00067 |
Grade A, and why
playbook-webapp scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 33 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Web App Pentest — methodology + skill router
This is the ORDER of operations and the map to the deep skills. Each vuln CLASS has a dedicated web-<class> skill with exact payloads + detect→exploit→PROVE — load the one matching the surface; don't test from this index.
1. Recon + active scan FIRST
Fingerprint stack+version (whatweb/httpx, headers), CMS (wpscan/etc.), APIs (/swagger, /graphql, /.well-known). Then a content-matched nuclei -u <t> pass BEFORE exhaustive dir-fuzz (framework-runtime RCEs don't appear as routes) → nuclei_parse. Version + a known CVE → fetch & vet a public PoC (shared exploitation methodology).
2. Map (hidden surface, AFTER the scan)
ffuf/gobuster (→ gobuster_parse), vhosts (ffuf -H Host:FUZZ), params (arjun), auth endpoints (login/register/reset/OAuth), API routes. Review client-side JS for endpoints/secrets.
3. Test by class → load the matching skill
| Signal / surface | Load |
|---|---|
| param → DB query, SQL error/differential | web-sqli |
| input renders in a server template ({{7*7}}) | web-ssti |
| server fetches a URL you control (webhook/proxy/import) | web-ssrf |
file param / download / ../ reflection |
web-lfi-traversal |
| file upload sink | web-upload-rce |
| XML/SOAP/SAML/DOCX/SVG parsing | web-xxe |
| serialized blob (rO0/O:/VIEWSTATE/pickle) | web-deserialization |
| object IDs, roles, JWT, admin funcs | web-auth-bypass-idor |
| known framework+version CVE | shared exploitation methodology + searchsploit/nuclei |
Also-check (no dedicated skill yet): XSS (dalfox, xss_detect), command injection (;id/$(id)), CSRF, CORS/security-headers, crypto/secrets-in-JS, business-logic/race conditions. |
4. PROVE + Report
A finding is suspected until you reproduce concrete impact (dumped canary row / id / file bytes / cloud creds / cross-user data) — then add_vuln confirmed with the evidence. Never mark a host resolved/"safe" without a completed active scan. Report: reproduction steps + request/response evidence + CVSS + OWASP-WSTG mapping.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 33 lines · 78 tokens per session scan A 3ae0659e1511
playbook-webapp is a skill published in the GitHub repository s0ld13rr/pentestcode (849 stars, last pushed 14d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 78 tokens to every session and 673 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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