Baseline Security Checks

Pattern declaration

Primary pattern: Reviewer Secondary patterns: Inversion Why: セキュリティチェックはチェックリスト型評価が主だが、セキュリティ無関係の変更では実行を止めるゲートが必要

Guidance

• Look for string-concatenated queries or unsafe ORM calls; require parameterization.
• Flag unescaped HTML sinks (dangerouslySetInnerHTML/innerHTML) and missing sanitization.
• Catch secrets or tokens hardcoded in code; prefer environment/config inputs.
• Ensure input validation and authz/CSRF/error handling paths exist without leaking sensitive detail.
• Open redirect: a return URL may pass a same-host check by a server-side parser (e.g. PHP parse_url), then reach Location / redirect() / href. Check that values containing \ are rejected before that check.
  • PHP parse_url('http://evil.example\\@self.example/', PHP_URL_HOST) returns self.example.
  • Browsers (WHATWG URL) treat \ as / and navigate to evil.example.
  • If the value is decoded again after the check (double encoding, a later urldecode), reject %5C as well.
  • Rejecting \ / %5C alone is not enough. A check that skips values without a parse_url host lets http:evil.example and /<TAB>/evil.example through. Browsers resolve both to evil.example.
  • Raise confidence when a sibling implementation in the same repository already rejects \ / %5C.
• Lexical-shape exemptions: when a diff adds or widens an allowlist that skips masking/validation because a value looks like a path or variable reference, check non-canonical forms that would wrongly hit it (.. segments, empty segments //, trailing delimiters, case variants, %2F, a second assignment on the same line), and expect tests pinning that those forms stay masked/rejected.

Non-goals

• テスト用ダミー値や意図された緩和を推測で脆弱と決めつけない。

Pre-execution Gate / 実行前ゲート

このスキルは以下の条件がすべて満たされない限りNO_REVIEWを返す。

• 差分にアプリケーションコード（api/, routes/, db/, auth/等）の変更が含まれている
• 差分がテストファイルやフィクスチャのみでない
• 外部入力の処理、認証/認可、データ永続化のいずれかに関連するコードが含まれている

ゲート不成立時の出力: NO_REVIEW: security-basic — セキュリティ関連のアプリケーションコード変更が検出されない