Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to saeedkolivand/ai-job-hunter-app. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/saeedkolivand/ai-job-hunter-app/main/.claude/skills/security-checklist/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/saeedkolivand/ai-job-hunter-appWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/saeedkolivand/ai-job-hunter-app/security-checklist)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/saeedkolivand/ai-job-hunter-app/security-checklist"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/saeedkolivand/ai-job-hunter-app/security-checklist/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/saeedkolivand/ai-job-hunter-app/security-checklist"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/saeedkolivand/ai-job-hunter-app/security-checklist.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00046 | $0.01074 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00537 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00215 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00107 |
Grade A, and why
security-checklist scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 47 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security checklist
Authoritative: docs/knowledge/security-rules.md. Severity bias for security/data findings = round UP.
Risk assessment (every change)
- What assets / user data are affected? What attack surface changes? What abuse opportunities open?
Validation
- Inputs validated · outputs sanitized · permissions minimized · secrets protected · errors handled securely · logging reviewed (no secrets/PII in logs) · dependencies reviewed.
Abuse / cost (DoS & spend)
- Rate limits / request throttling present? AI usage + cost caps? Export/resource limits? Can a user spam, exhaust CPU/memory, or run up API spend?
AI security
- Can user input manipulate system prompts (injection)? Can sensitive data leak into prompts? Can AI reach unintended tools? Is AI output validated?
Data
- Resume/PII protected · temp files cleaned up · export files secured · local storage/cache secured · retention & deletion honored (GDPR).
Desktop / supply chain
tauri.conf.jsonCSP intact (incl. Ollama127.0.0.1:11434) ·capabilities/default.jsonleast-privilege · updater signing key +latest.jsonintegrity ·deny.toml/cargo audit/pnpm auditclean · new deps license-checked.
External standards & best-practices (verified 2026-06-19)
Re-baseline to current editions: OWASP Top 10 2025 (was 2021), ASVS 5.0 (was 4.x), SLSA v1.2 (was v1.0), LLM Top 10 2025, CWE Top 25 2025. Cite these, not older ones.
- OWASP Top 10:2025 (RC Nov 2025 — confirm final before locking ranks) https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/ — new vs 2021:
A03 Software Supply-Chain Failures(expands old A06) andA10 Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions; SSRF folded into A01; A02 Security Misconfiguration rose to #2. - OWASP ASVS 5.0.0 (2025-05-30) — verify against L1/L2/L3. https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS
- OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) — LLM01 Prompt Injection · LLM02 Sensitive-Info · LLM05 Improper Output Handling · LLM06 Excessive Agency · LLM07 System-Prompt Leakage. https://genai.owasp.org/llm-top-10/
- Supply chain (now OWASP A03): target SLSA Build L3 (https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.2/); commit
pnpm-lock.yaml+ CI--frozen-lockfile;cargo audit/cargo denyvs RUSTSEC daily. ⚠️ Provenance ≠ safety — the 2025–26 Shai-Hulud npm worm shipped malware with valid SLSA L3 provenance via hijacked OIDC tokens → pin exact versions,--ignore-scripts, scope-lock publish tokens. https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/npm-supply-chain-attack/ - Frameworks: NIST SSDF (SP 800-218) + CISA Secure-by-Design as the baseline.
- Secrets → OS keychain (
tauri-plugin-stronghold/keyring), never config/logs. Tauri least-privilege capabilities + strict CSP + minisign-signed updater (any manifest/key compromise = full takeover). https://v2.tauri.app/security/ - CWE Top 25 (2025-12-11) — #1 XSS, #2 SQLi, #3 CSRF; watch CWE-284 (Improper Access Control), CWE-639 (authz bypass via user-controlled key), CWE-770 (alloc without limits). https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2025/12/11/2025-cwe-top-25-most-dangerous-software-weaknesses
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 47 lines · 46 tokens per session scan A 88b04b0b345e
security-checklist is a skill published in the GitHub repository saeedkolivand/ai-job-hunter-app (55 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 46 tokens to every session and 1,074 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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