orchestrator-container-spawn

orchestrator-container-spawn is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from samugit83/redamon. It costs 103 tokens per session (1,718 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A guide for starting and securing Docker containers used by a security scanning coordinator. It focuses on permissions, mounts, and settings that affect whether scans can run and write files.

In plain words
What is it for?
It is for changing container launch settings, bind mounts, temporary filesystems, user permissions, and related scan-orchestration code.
Why use it?
It helps avoid security changes that accidentally stop containers from starting or prevent them from writing to host-mounted files.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one. Also seen: mentions AGENTS.md.

Good fit It is for changing container launch settings, bind mounts, temporary filesystems, user permissions, and related scan-orchestration code.

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Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/samugit83/redamon/orchestrator-container-spawn
About the project

RedAmon is an AI framework that connects reconnaissance, exploitation, and post-exploitation activities into an automated security-testing pipeline, while organizing findings and proposing code fixes. It is for authorized penetration testing, security research, and education. The catalogue entries provide skills and instructions for working with the framework.

samugit83/redamon · 3,182 stars · on GitHub · redamon.org

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add samugit83/redamon --skill orchestrator-container-spawn
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/samugit83/redamon

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for orchestrator-container-spawn

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/samugit83/redamon/orchestrator-container-spawn/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/samugit83/redamon/orchestrator-container-spawn)
Your own site
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Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for orchestrator-container-spawn

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/samugit83/redamon/orchestrator-container-spawn"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/samugit83/redamon/orchestrator-container-spawn.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 103 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 1,718 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 1 finding. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. Third-party audits
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector warn 7 Sept 2026
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to medium

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

  • medium Privilege Escalation · line 102
    Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
    Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
How audits are shown
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00103 $0.01718
Opus 5.5 $0.00041 $0.00687
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00021 $0.00344
Haiku 4.5 $0.00010 $0.00172

Measured 1mo ago against content hash dfaee4d08989, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

orchestrator-container-spawn scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Asks for rootlowPrivilege escalation

A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.

Scan containers run as root and **bind-mount host-owned source** (the live

Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.

skills/orchestrator-container-spawn/SKILL.md · 119 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 119 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

When to Use

For the no-env_file knob rule, see the recon_orchestrator AGENTS.md CRITICAL RULES (not repeated here).


Critical Rules

  • NEVER add cap_drop: [ALL] to a scan container that writes to a host-owned source bind mount. It strips CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, so root-in-container can no longer write the host-owned files, and the scan breaks. This was reverted after breaking recon/partial spawns; hardening is deliberately deferred with drop_caps=False at every spawn site (container_manager.py:837, :1798, :2168). Keep it deferred unless the mount is not host-owned.
  • NEVER add security_opt: no-new-privileges to these spawns. It breaks execve for non-root users inside the recon image (reverted once already): container_manager.py:939.
  • NEVER add a tmpfs mount without uid/gid/mode when the container runs as a NON-ROOT user and the mount lands on a path that user must write. Docker mounts a tmpfs root-owned 0755 unless told otherwise (only /tmp gets the 1777 default), and the mount SHADOWS whatever the image built at that path - so a tmpfs added to give a non-root user writable scratch is what takes it away. This shipped: the TruffleHog spawn's /home/trufflehog tmpfs hid the home dir useradd --create-home had given uid 10001, and github_experimental died on "failed to create .trufflehog folder in user's home directory" while the other thirteen sources were fine, because it is the only one that writes to $HOME. Build the spec in _trufflehog_tmpfs(), not inline, and size-cap every entry - an uncapped tmpfs is host RAM a hostile archive can exhaust.
  • ALWAYS apply hardening through _scanner_hardening() (container_manager.py:567), not ad-hoc per spawn, so all three spawn sites stay consistent.
  • ALWAYS keep sibling_host_path() robust to BOTH POSIX (/) and Windows (\) host paths (container_manager.py:53). It derives a sibling source dir's host path for bind mounts; a POSIX-only assumption breaks spawns on Windows hosts. Its two companions parent_host_path() and join_host_path() carry the same POSIX+Windows discipline - never swap in pathlib / Path(...).parent, which collapses a Windows host path on the Linux orchestrator.
  • NEVER assume a scanner source dir is a repo-root sibling. Scanners live two levels deep under scanners/<name>/, so a bind mount to a repo-root sibling (e.g. graph_db) must climb out of scanners/ first: sibling_host_path(parent_host_path(scanner_path), "graph_db"), and a scanners/-nested sibling is reached with join_host_path(parent_host_path(recon_path), "scanners", "supply_chain_common"). The old sibling_host_path(scanner_path, "graph_db") now resolves to a nonexistent scanners/graph_db; Docker silently binds an empty root-owned dir there and graph writes / imports fail with no error. The build context climbs two parents: parent_host_path(parent_host_path(scanner_path)).
  • NEVER bind /app/graph_db directly at a spawn site. Always route it through self._graph_db_mount(<derived>, baked_into_image=...) (container_manager.py:605). Deriving graph_db's host path is a LAST RESORT, not the mechanism: the real path is auto-detected from the orchestrator's own ./graph_db:/app/graph_db:ro mount (GRAPH_DB_PATH, resolved in api.py exactly like RECON_PATH). The derivation is only right when Docker reports the literal repo path - Docker Desktop on Windows/WSL2 reports rewritten bind Source strings whose sibling is nowhere, Docker auto-creates that path EMPTY, and the empty dir shadows the graph_db baked into the scan image. Every spawned scan then dies with cannot import name 'Neo4jClient' from 'graph_db' (unknown location) (issue #169). baked_into_image=True for recon / gvm / github-hunt (they COPY graph_db, so no mount beats a wrong mount); False only for supply-chain, which does not bake it. TruffleHog has NO graph_db mount at all: its container is the dirty half of a dirty/clean split and holds no Neo4j credentials, so the orchestrator ingests its findings afterwards.
  • ALWAYS resolve a new host source path with _get_host_path() + a compose mount, not by string surgery on another path. If a spawn needs host dir X, mount X into the orchestrator so Docker itself reports its source. A missing bind source is not an error to Docker; it silently becomes an empty directory.

Read the full file on GitHub · 119 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 1mo ago First seen · 119 lines · 103 tokens per session scan A dfaee4d08989

Subscribe to this mod's changes

orchestrator-container-spawn is a skill published in the GitHub repository samugit83/redamon (3,182 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 103 tokens to every session and 1,718 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (asks for root). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

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