RedAmon is an AI framework that connects reconnaissance, exploitation, and post-exploitation activities into an automated security-testing pipeline, while organizing findings and proposing code fixes. It is for authorized penetration testing, security research, and education. The catalogue entries provide skills and instructions for working with the framework.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add samugit83/redamon --skill orchestrator-container-spawngit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/samugit83/redamonWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/samugit83/redamon/orchestrator-container-spawn)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/samugit83/redamon/orchestrator-container-spawn"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/samugit83/redamon/orchestrator-container-spawn/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/samugit83/redamon/orchestrator-container-spawn"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/samugit83/redamon/orchestrator-container-spawn.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 102 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00103 | $0.01718 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00041 | $0.00687 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00021 | $0.00344 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00172 |
Grade A, and why
orchestrator-container-spawn scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootlowPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
Scan containers run as root and **bind-mount host-owned source** (the live Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 119 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
When to Use
- Changing how the orchestrator launches or secures a scan container (recon_orchestrator/container_manager.py).
For the no-env_file knob rule, see the recon_orchestrator
AGENTS.md CRITICAL RULES (not repeated here).
Critical Rules
- NEVER add
cap_drop: [ALL]to a scan container that writes to a host-owned source bind mount. It stripsCAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, so root-in-container can no longer write the host-owned files, and the scan breaks. This was reverted after breaking recon/partial spawns; hardening is deliberately deferred withdrop_caps=Falseat every spawn site (container_manager.py:837, :1798, :2168). Keep it deferred unless the mount is not host-owned. - NEVER add
security_opt: no-new-privilegesto these spawns. It breaksexecvefor non-root users inside the recon image (reverted once already): container_manager.py:939. - NEVER add a
tmpfsmount withoutuid/gid/modewhen the container runs as a NON-ROOT user and the mount lands on a path that user must write. Docker mounts a tmpfs root-owned 0755 unless told otherwise (only/tmpgets the 1777 default), and the mount SHADOWS whatever the image built at that path - so a tmpfs added to give a non-root user writable scratch is what takes it away. This shipped: the TruffleHog spawn's/home/trufflehogtmpfs hid the home diruseradd --create-homehad given uid 10001, andgithub_experimentaldied on "failed to create .trufflehog folder in user's home directory" while the other thirteen sources were fine, because it is the only one that writes to$HOME. Build the spec in_trufflehog_tmpfs(), not inline, and size-cap every entry - an uncapped tmpfs is host RAM a hostile archive can exhaust. - ALWAYS apply hardening through
_scanner_hardening()(container_manager.py:567), not ad-hoc per spawn, so all three spawn sites stay consistent. - ALWAYS keep
sibling_host_path()robust to BOTH POSIX (/) and Windows (\) host paths (container_manager.py:53). It derives a sibling source dir's host path for bind mounts; a POSIX-only assumption breaks spawns on Windows hosts. Its two companionsparent_host_path()andjoin_host_path()carry the same POSIX+Windows discipline - never swap inpathlib/Path(...).parent, which collapses a Windows host path on the Linux orchestrator. - NEVER assume a scanner source dir is a repo-root sibling. Scanners live two
levels deep under
scanners/<name>/, so a bind mount to a repo-root sibling (e.g.graph_db) must climb out ofscanners/first:sibling_host_path(parent_host_path(scanner_path), "graph_db"), and ascanners/-nested sibling is reached withjoin_host_path(parent_host_path(recon_path), "scanners", "supply_chain_common"). The oldsibling_host_path(scanner_path, "graph_db")now resolves to a nonexistentscanners/graph_db; Docker silently binds an empty root-owned dir there and graph writes / imports fail with no error. The build context climbs two parents:parent_host_path(parent_host_path(scanner_path)). - NEVER bind
/app/graph_dbdirectly at a spawn site. Always route it throughself._graph_db_mount(<derived>, baked_into_image=...)(container_manager.py:605). Deriving graph_db's host path is a LAST RESORT, not the mechanism: the real path is auto-detected from the orchestrator's own./graph_db:/app/graph_db:romount (GRAPH_DB_PATH, resolved inapi.pyexactly likeRECON_PATH). The derivation is only right when Docker reports the literal repo path - Docker Desktop on Windows/WSL2 reports rewritten bindSourcestrings whose sibling is nowhere, Docker auto-creates that path EMPTY, and the empty dir shadows the graph_db baked into the scan image. Every spawned scan then dies withcannot import name 'Neo4jClient' from 'graph_db' (unknown location)(issue #169).baked_into_image=Truefor recon / gvm / github-hunt (they COPY graph_db, so no mount beats a wrong mount);Falseonly for supply-chain, which does not bake it. TruffleHog has NO graph_db mount at all: its container is the dirty half of a dirty/clean split and holds no Neo4j credentials, so the orchestrator ingests its findings afterwards. - ALWAYS resolve a new host source path with
_get_host_path()+ a compose mount, not by string surgery on another path. If a spawn needs host dirX, mountXinto the orchestrator so Docker itself reports its source. A missing bind source is not an error to Docker; it silently becomes an empty directory.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 119 lines · 103 tokens per session scan A dfaee4d08989
orchestrator-container-spawn is a skill published in the GitHub repository samugit83/redamon (3,182 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 103 tokens to every session and 1,718 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (asks for root). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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