What is tm-security-review?

A comprehensive security review that first creates or uses a STRIDE threat model, a structured way to identify threats to system components and trust boundaries. It then performs a deep review of the whole repository and validates confirmed findings with runnable proof-of-concept examples.

Use it for deep, whole-codebase security investigations, especially when a change crosses a trust boundary or a quick review finds a serious design concern.

It catches design-level security risks that a change-only scan may miss. The trust model helps distinguish genuinely dangerous flows from inputs that only appear risky.

tm-security-review — Skill for Claude Code by Security-Phoenix-demo

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent

npx skills add Security-Phoenix-demo/security-skills-claude-code --skill tm-security-review

Clone the repo

git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Security-Phoenix-demo/security-skills-claude-code

Made for: Claude Code.

Or install phoenix-security-review, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 6 skills, 4 commands, 1 agent.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

README.md

[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/security-phoenix-demo/security-skills-claude-code/tm-security-review/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/security-phoenix-demo/security-skills-claude-code/tm-security-review)

Your own site

<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/security-phoenix-demo/security-skills-claude-code/tm-security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/security-phoenix-demo/security-skills-claude-code/tm-security-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

Your own site · 80×15

<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/security-phoenix-demo/security-skills-claude-code/tm-security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/security-phoenix-demo/security-skills-claude-code/tm-security-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>

Per session 146 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.

When invoked 1,547 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.

Security scan A 1 finding. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.

Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.

Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

Model	Per session	Once invoked
Fable 5.1	$0.00146	$0.01547
Opus 5.5	$0.00058	$0.00619
Sonnet 5.5	$0.00029	$0.00309
Haiku 4.5	$0.00015	$0.00155

Measured 1mo ago against content hash bd1cc7deec6c, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

tm-security-review scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

- **PoC** — a concrete, runnable proof (curl / payload / unit snippet) in a fenced block.

plugins/phoenix-security-review/skills/tm-security-review/SKILL.md · 83 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 83 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

TM Security Review (comprehensive tier)

Model first, hunt second. A bare hunt enumerates source→sink flows but never asks "is this source actually lower-trust than its sink?" — so it over-rates operator-controlled inputs (CLI flags, config, a JAR on the classpath) as HIGH and misses the real design risk (e.g. an indirect-prompt-injection → auto-exec chain). The threat model supplies that missing trust-direction check. This skill builds the model, then runs the sophisticated zeroday exploit hunt against it.

This is the deep, comprehensive, whole-repo review with a threat model as input — the heavier of the two tiers. When you only need a quick pass over the changes on a branch/worktree, use tm-quick-security-assessment instead (and optionally hand its finding surface here for the deep follow-up).

It composes two sibling skills:

Phase 0 → threat-modeling (../threat-modeling/SKILL.md) — STRIDE/DREAD, DFD, trust boundaries.
Phases 1-3 → 0day-scanner (../0day-scanner/SKILL.md) — the LLM exploit engine, run in deep mode, steered by the model's KEY threats. Its on-disk fallback (security-reviewer/languages/* + 8-point check) applies when the MCP tool is unreachable.

When to use

"threat model security review", "hunt for exploitable vulns with a threat model", "/security-review"
Agentic / LLM / MCP / connector codebases; whole-repo or pre-merge exploit review
You need a runnable PoC + evidence chain per finding, not a posture summary

Inputs (ask; if user is away, default + label `[ASSUMPTION]`)

Target: repo path / service / feature / diff + commit or branch.
Existing threat model? If handed one (e.g. *-threat-model.md), ingest it as Phase 0 — do not regenerate.
Deployment/trust context (drives severity): self-hosted library vs hosted multi-tenant service; who is the attacker vs the operator; any network-exposed surface (stdio vs HTTP)?

Phase 0 — Threat model (run the `threat-modeling` skill)

Produce, or ingest, a STRIDE-per-trust-boundary model. Beyond that skill's default output, require:

DFD with every trust-boundary crossing labelled TBn, and a | ID | Boundary | Crosses | Primary risk | table.
Confidence label on every threat: [CONFIRMED] / [REFUTED] / [ASSUMPTION] / [QUESTION].
AI surfaces mapped to OWASP Top 10 for LLM Apps 2025 (LLM01 prompt injection, LLM02 sensitive-info disclosure, LLM05 improper output handling, LLM06 excessive agency, LLM08, LLM10). These design risks are the ones no pattern scanner can test.
Severity calibrated to the deployment context from Inputs.
Surface the [QUESTION]/[ASSUMPTION] items that change severity and ask the user; if away, take the conservative default and mark it.

Read the full file on GitHub · 83 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

1mo ago First seen · 83 lines · 146 tokens per session scan A bd1cc7deec6c

Subscribe to this mod's changes

tm-security-review is a skill published in the GitHub repository Security-Phoenix-demo/security-skills-claude-code (81 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 146 tokens to every session and 1,547 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-11.